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SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) control systems are widely
used to control critical processes in various economically and safety critical commercial
industries. SCADA control systems are often vulnerable to attacks due to previous
industry reliance on security by obscurity to protect control systems. There is a need for
an architecture which can log the communications traffic in the SCADA networks. In this
work a forensic network traffic data logger retrofit solution for MODBUS and DNP3
network appliances is presented. The data logger uses a bump-in-wire configuration to
capture the network transactions, timestamp, cryptographically sign, encrypt and store the
network transactions. The data logger is developed to run on embedded and virtual
machine platforms. Thus, a retrofit forensic network traffic data logger logs the network
traffic in a SCADA control system efficiently without affecting the normal functionality
of the control system and the logger data supports post incident forensics analysis.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. Modern
society has become dependent on critical infrastructure using SCADA such as water
treatment and distribution plants, electricity generation and, distribution, petroleum
refining and distribution, nuclear energy generation and distribution and manufacturing
sector including chemical manufacturing, commercial manufacturing and defense
industrial base etc. Failure of these systems can lead to financial and property losses and
physical harm to the citizenry. Many of these critical infrastructure use a common set of
electronic control systems, collectively called supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems, to manage complex and potentially dangerous processes. SCADA
systems are used to monitor sensors, to open and close valves, and to toggle switches
remotely over a networked environment. In typical installations, the network
infrastructure itself is poorly protected, leaving the entire SCADA system vulnerable to
failure and attacks through malicious activity.
Typical control systems have one or more MTU (Master Terminal Units) which
monitor and control downstream nodes called remote terminal units (RTU) and
intelligent electronic devices (IED). IEDs are intelligent sensor and control devices which
are programmable to meet requirements for a specific process. RTU are more generic
programmable devices which allow engineers to customize individual sensor and control
connections and correspondingly customize process controls. The master, RTU, and IED
1

nodes are typically networked with MODBUS [1] or DNP3 [2] protocols which
communicate over RS-232[3], RS-485[4] serial ports. Additionally, it is common for
control systems to be distributed of large distances. In these cases, operators often use
wireless communication protocols (often proprietary) or telephony based
communications to bridge distances.
SCADA wireless and telephony based communications are often vulnerable to
intrusion. Such intrusions are possible because of limited access control capabilities,
SCADA operator tendency to use default communication configurations, and the
tendency to leave configurations unchanged over long periods of time. Such
vulnerabilities have led to at least one documented attack which occurred in Australia in
2000 [5]. In this case, a disgruntled former employee used radio equipment to access and
controls multiple sewage plant control system throughout the country. Over a period of
three months, the attacker modified control system RTU to create waste water leaks
which ultimately led to over 200,000 gallons of raw sewage into local fresh water
sources. Because the attacker in this case was accessing the control system RTU had no
data logging capabilities over a communication channel unknown to the system operators
his accesses went completely undetected and unlogged. If all communications to the
penetrated RTU had been logged operators would have easily known an outsider was
accessing the system after the initial leaks were detected because logged communication
at the RTU would not match log transmissions from known master nodes. Without data
logging at the RTU, the actual case, engineers were baffled by the leaks and took 3 years
to learn the true source of the problem. Ultimately, the attacker was found after a tip led
authorities to search the attacker’s home, at which time they found the radio equipment
used to carry out attacks. This incident highlights the need for a SCADA data logger
2

which can capture all the SCADA network traffic to prevent attacks on the SCADA
system and use this logged information in post forensics analysis. The data logger can
also be used to as sensor input for Intrusion Detection System (IDS) solutions and to aid
the system debugging.
1.1

SCADA Data Logger Overview
The thesis objective is to design the SCADA data logger which logs the network

transactions in the SCADA control system network and the logger data supports the post
forensic analysis. The SCADA data logger meets all the requirements listed in the table
1.1.The SCADA Data logger is implemented on both the embedded platform and the
virtual machine platform. The embedded platform data logger uses the Xilinx FPGA
board and network traffic is logged to a compact flash card available on the FPGA.
Whereas, the virtual machine data logger is implemented as Linux process running on the
personal computer (PC) and uses either the internal hard disk space or the external
memory attached to the PC. In both the cases, the logged data is securely stored using
cryptographic methods HMAC [6] (underlying function SHA-1[7]) and Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [8] with counter mode (CTR) [9] based on the American Gas
Association Standards. The SCADA data logger supports SCADA protocols MODBUS
and DNP3. The data logger operation is active with the network, but still it delivers the
complete traffic unmodified and in time. The data logger is operated in two modes
namely fast forward-store mode and store-forward mode. In the store-forward mode, the
traffic from master to slave and vice versa are retained in data logger until the other
operations such as, time stamping, signing and encrypting the data. Once all the above
operations are completed the transaction is sent out from the data logger. Where as in fast
3

forward mode, the data logger receives and transmits byte by byte from one end (Master)
to another end (Slave) and vice versa. In this case, the operation such as time stamping,
signing and encryption does not affect the normal functioning of the control system. The
validation of the SCADA data logger is done by testing the working model at Mississippi
State University (MSU) SCADA Security Laboratory. The MSU SCADA Security
Laboratory consists of 2 masters PC and 5 slaves connected and controlled by the HMI
interface. The model SCADA systems (2 masters and 5 slaves) and the data logger work
on all the 5 slaves. Also the values of round trip time latency are measured on three
configurations: Loopback, Test PC to embedded platform and Test PC to virtual machine
platform data logger. In The test PC to embedded platform data logger and test PC to
virtual machine platform data logger, the data logger operates in fast forward-store and
Store-forward modes. The loopback configuration is used as baseline for comparison
study and value of the roundtrip time latency in this configuration is lowest compared to
other configurations. The test PC to embedded platform and test PC to virtual machine
platform configurations helps in finding the delay caused by the data logger. Based the
comparison studies between the above configurations and modes, the data logger
operated in fast forward mode is faster than store-forward mode and has less impact on
the overall latency of the system and virtual machine platform is efficient compared to
the embedded platform.
1.2

SCADA Data Logger Requirements
Table 1 lists a set of requirements for SCADA data logger. First requirement is to

support the bump-in wire configuration. The data logger should be retrofit module that
fits in the legacy SCADA systems and does not distributes the normal functioning of the
4

SCADA system. Second requirement is to support the post forensic analysis. The post
forensic analysis helps in finding the reasons for various attacks and intrusions detections
etc. As the data logger supports the post forensic analysis, the data logger should protect
the network transactions by it. To ensure the protection of the data, the process of time
stamping, signing and encrypting of data is done.
Third requirement platform ensures that data logger works on both Personal
computer (PC) and embedded platforms with some minor changes in the hardware
abstraction layer. The implementation of SCADA data logger helps to run the data
logging as a Linux process on the HMI and log the network transaction even on the HMI
side. The embedded version data logger helps logging the network transactions at
RTU/IED level in remote sites. The selection of the platform is dependent on other
parameters such as cost, processing powers and easy deployments etc. Fourth
requirement is protocol compatible, the data logger should work independent of the
SCADA protocols (MODBUS, DNP3) used for the communications between the master
and slave nodes. Fifth, Harmless requirements guarantees that the active operation of the
data logger does not affect the normal functionality of the control system. This
requirement is proved by validating the SCADA data logger at MSU SCADA Security
Laboratory and through measuring the latency values in different configurations. The
SCADA data logger does not interfere with the normal functioning of the control system
and it adds minimal delay to network transactions.

5

Table 1.1
No

SCADA Data Logger Requirements
Requirement

Description

1

Bump-in-wire retrofit

2

Support Post forensic analysis

3

Platform Compatible

4

Protocol compatible

5

Harmless

6

Data Acquisition

7

Log Data

8

Store Data

9

Offline analysis

10

Support Active analysis

The data logger should be able to fit legacy
SCADA system in bump -in- wire
configuration
The stored data on the data logger should help
in post forensic analysis and thus the
protection of the data is highly required,
which achieved using signing and encrypting
the data.
The data logger should be compatible to work
on both the PC and embedded platforms
The data logger should be independent of the
SCADA protocol used in the SCADA
communications i.e Modbus and DNP3
The security retrofit module should not affect
the normal function of the control system
This requirement ensures that the complete
transactions between the master and slave are
acquired.
This helps in time stamping the network
transactions while acquiring, signing and
encrypting the data.
The process of storing data involves the
selection of the storage media depending on
the type of platform used for data logger, size
of memory etc
This involves the extraction of data from the
stored transactions using cryptographic
techniques
The bump-in wire configuration makes the
data logger active with network, which helps
in supporting the active analysis in future

Sixth, the data logger must be able to acquire the data from the network
efficiently without errors in the data. The SCADA data logger supports data acquisition
based on RS232 and RS 485 physical connections. Seventh, log data is to prepare the
data acquired to storage. This requirement guarantees properties like time stamping, data
6

integrity and data privacy. The time stamping of the data helps in future analysis of the
stored data and data integrity, privacy are achieved using the cryptographic functions
such as Hash message authentic code (Underlying function SHA-1) and Advanced
Encryption Standard operating in (counter mode).
Eighth requirement, store data is actual process of storing data to memory and
uses it for future forensic analysis. It is dependent on the type, lifetime and reliability of
the storage media used for the storage. Ninth requirement, the offline analysis is the
actual process of the extracting the data from the storage data. As the data logger uses the
signing and encryption of data along with timestamp while storing the data in the
memory. The offline analysis involves the process of decrypting the stored data, verifying
the signature and gives the original transaction for the post forensic analysis. Finally, the
data logger should be able to support active analysis. This helps in integrating the
efficient intrusion detection system (IDS) to data logger and scanning for the intrusions
online by reducing the logging data.
Thus the SCADA data logger satisfies the above requirements and does not affect
the normal functioning of the control system The SCADA data logger is implemented on
both an embedded platform (FPGA) and the virtual machine platform, which can
efficiently log the SCADA communications. The embedded platform data logger can be
used at level, where as the virtual machine platform data logger version can be
implemented as Linux process running in a virtual machine on the same PC which hosts
the HMI. Both version of data loggers helps in logging network transactions the logged
information can be used for in post forensic analysis.

7

1.3

Thesis Organization
Organization of thesis chapters is presented in this section to provide an overview

of presented topics in this research work. The second chapter consists of background and
details related to SCADA system, SCADA protocols and their related topics. Chapter 3
explains about the basic functional structure of the SCADA data logger, and need of data
logging in SCADA systems. Chapter 4 presents the motivation behind the development
of SCADA data logger, proposed architecture of data logger and its requirements,
implementation details and testing environment. Chapter 5 presents the results based on
latency values in various configurations on different platforms. Discussions and analysis
were presented on the basis of the results obtained. Chapter 6 concludes the research
work and suggests the future on this research topic.
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CHAPTER II
OVERVIEW OF SCADA CONTROL SYSTEMS
2.1

Introduction
This chapter gives a brief introduction and discussion about important topics

related to thesis subject. SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data acquisition) control
systems are widely used to control critical process in various economically and safety
critical commercial industries. The major components of SCADA system, evolution of
SCADA architecture in various generations and protocols such as MODBUS, DNP3
which plays vital role in the communications between the components of the SCADA
system are explained in this chapter. The common attacks on the SCADA system such as
response injection attack, command injection attack and denial of service attack are
explained. This chapter includes details about the Mississippi State University (MSU)
SCADA Security Laboratory.
2.2

General SCADA Architecture
SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.

SCADA systems are widely used to monitor and control a plant or equipment in
industries such as Petro chemical, manufacturing, power generation and distribution
Telecommunications, water and waste control, energy, oil and gas refining etc. Figure 2.1
shows the general architecture of the SCADA system. The main components of the
SCADA system are the Master Terminal Unit (MTU), Remote Terminal Unit (RTU),
Human Machine Interface (HMI), Historian, Communication Channels. Each component
9

has diverse functionality and design. The Control center is the hub of SCADA operations.
Control center consists of master terminal units, HMI (Human Machine Interface),
Historian and shared resources.

Satellite

ControlCenter

RTU

Historian

Radio
RTU

Internet

HMI

Internet

RTU

Master
RTU
Leasedlineorswitchedtelephone

Figure 2.1

General Architecture of SCADA System

Generally, in the SCADA structure, a single master exists which communicates
with a hierarchy of sub masters and slaves. The communication between master - slave is
initiated by master and slave gives the response. Master and sub master stations have
plentiful of memory and processing resources; because they are commonly personal
computers or industrial pc’s running WINDOWS, LINUX, UNIX etc.
The HMI is the software component that allows the operators to interact with a
SCADA system. The functions such as monitoring, controlling, modifying the control
process and devices settings. The HMI give a pictorial representation of the SCADA
system and displays process status information, reports etc. HMIs for SCADA systems
can be accessed using Desktop PCs, web browsers etc. For example, in the Mississippi
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State University SCADA Security Laboratory, the HMI software is installed on a desktop
PC using it the entire setup can be controlled.
The historian is a database of the historical data from the SCADA system. The
historian is updated by the master and the data on the historian can be accessed by the
HMI. The stored data from the historian can be retrieved by sending queries from the
HMI. Generally, the Historian is located in highly secured places, because it contains all
the information about the SCADA system configuration, field devices settings and also
some logs entries. If an attacker takes control of this historian, the total functioning of the
control system is affected. Thus protection of historian is highly required.
Remote terminal unit (RTU) is a programmable device that interfaces the physical
world with the control system (SCADA) and can be customized by the engineers. RTU
monitors both the analog and digital parameters, transmits the parameters to central
master station. In general, RTU are connected to field devices such as actuators, switches
and sensors. The major function of the RTU is to receive the information from the field
devices and convert in to language that is compatible to the SCADA system
communication protocols (MODBUS, DNP3 etc). Some of features of the RTU are have
limited memory, less processing power, and can run only fixed programs(c or ladder
logic).
The communication network is established between the master and field based
RTUs. The communication network can be wired or wireless networks. Different media
like leased lines, dial-up phones, Internet, Radio and satellite are used. In general, leases
lines and dial phones are economical to cover a large geographical area. Radio and
internet can be used to communicate with remote site devices and is economical
compared to leased lines.
11

Thus the SCADA is the mainly used to control and monitors the various control
system and processes. Master terminal Unit, Remote Terminal unit and communication
network are the vital components in the SCADA system.
2.3

SCADA System Generations
Initially SCADA system were developed to support basic control system process

and later various generations of SCADA system evolved with advanced features. The
three generations of the SCADA systems are Monolithic SCADA System, Distributed
SCADA System and Networked SCADA System [10].
Monolithic SCADA system is considered as the first generation SCADA systems.
In this SCADA system, a single centralized master and several slaves exist. The
communications between the master and slaves are implemented using The WAN (wide
Area Network). Simple functions such as monitoring and controlling the RTUs are
supported in this generation. The main disadvantage in this generation is the hardware
software and peripheral are vendor specific only.
The second generation of the SCADA architectures is distributed SCADA system.
In this generation, the processing is distributed among the multiple stations. Each station
in the system has specific assigned function. These stations are connected with Local
Area Networking (LAN).The distribution of the functions among various station
increases the processing time, redundancy and reliability of the SCADA system. For
example, some station works as communication processors, calculations processors,
database base systems, MI and etc. Even if any station fails to work, then another station
can be used to control the system without any delays. The communication between the

12

field based RTU and master is still dependent on the WAN and even the components are
vendor specific.
Networked SCADA system architecture is open rather than vendor specific and it
is the current generation. Open standards and protocols are used, which helped to
distribute the SCADA functionality across the WAN. The communication between the
master and slave RTUs can use WAN protocols and Internet Protocol (IP).The third party
devices like printers, hard drives etc., can be easily connected to the system. Due to
usage of standard protocols like internet protocol for communications between master
and slave, many SCADA systems are accessible from internet. As a result SCADA
systems are more prone to cyber-attacks.
2.4

SCADA Protocols
SCADA system uses standard protocols such as MODBUS and DNP3 for

communication between the Master Terminal Units and Remote Terminal Unit (RTU).
DNP3 is specially developed for the SCADA system communications. The description
about each protocol standards such as addressing rules, message formats etc are
explained in the following sections.
2.4.1

MODBUS Protocol
MODBUS protocol is an Application layer protocol [11]. It supports serial and

TCP/IP communications. A master-slave model consists of single master and slave. The
master issues explicitly commands to one of the slave nodes and process the request.
Generally, slave will not transmit data without request from the master and a slave does
not communicate with each other.

13

The MODBUS address space comprises 256 different addresses. The MODBUS
master node has no specific address and each slave have unique address on the serial bus.
The total address space is divided in to three different parts: Broadcast address (0), Slave
address (1 to 247) and Reserved (248-255).The MODBUS address space is shown in
figure 2.2.

Broadcast
0
Figure 2.2

Slave Address
1-247

Reserved
248-255

MODBUS Address Space

MODBUS over serial line is a master-slaves protocol. This protocol takes places
at second layer of the OSI Model. The general representation of MODBUS serial
communication compared to 7-layer OSI model as shown in figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3

OSI
MODEL

MODBUS Serial Line Protocol

Application

Modbus Application Protocol

Presentation

EMPTY

Session

EMPTY

Transport

EMPTY

Network

EMPTY

Data link

MODBUS serial line Protocol

Physical

RS232,RS-485

MODBUS Protocols and ISO/OSI Model

At the physical level, the communications using different physical interfaces
(RS232, RS485).RS232 interfaces can be used for the short distance communications.
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RS485 Two –Wire interface is commonly used physical interfaces and RS485 four wire
interfaces can be used as extended option.
The MODBUS data link layer consists of two sub layers: Master-slave protocol
and Transmission modes. The MODBUS operated in two modes: ASCII and RTU mode.
The MODBUS serial line protocol is master-slaves protocol. In general, only one
master is connected to bus and several slaves are connected to same serial bus. The
process of communication between the master and slaves is initiated by master. A single
MODBUS transaction is initiated by master. The communication between the master and
slaves occurs in two modes: Unicast Mode and Broadcast Mode
In the Unicast mode, the master addresses one single slave a same time. The
slaves are addressed by their respective address values assigned to them. Each slave has
unique address and values range from 1 to 247.In this mode the complete transaction
contains of two messages: a request from the master and response from the slave.

Master

Request

Slave

Reply
Figure 2.4

Unicast Mode

In the broadcast mode, the master addresses many slaves at same time. The
address 0 is reserved for the broadcast exchange between the master and slaves. The
MODBUS transaction in this mode consists of single message: a request from the master
and no replies from the slaves. Generally this mode is used for writing commands to
slaves.
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R1
Master

Slave
Slave

R2
R3

Slave

R1,R2,R3:Requests from master to slave
Figure 2.5

Broadcast Mode

Serial transmission modes defines the bit contents of message fields transmitted
serially and also explains the process of packing the data in to message fields. The
transmission mode and serial port parameters must be same for all the devices on a
MODBUS serial line. MODBUS serial transmission can be operated in two modes: RTU
Transmission mode and ASCII Transmission mode.
In this RTU Transmission mode, each message is transmitted in a continuous
stream of characters. The 8 bit binary coding system is followed in RTU mode. The bit
sequence of the RTU Mode with parity and no parity are shown in the figures (2.6) and
(2.7).

Start
Bit
Figure 2.6

Data Bits
1(LSB) 2

3

4

5

6

7

Parity bit
8(MSB) Even Odd

Stop
Bit

The RTU Bit Sequence(Parity Bit)

From the figure, the start bit indicates the start of the message. The data bits
consist of actual data to be transmitted. The data is transmitted from LSB (Least
Significant Bit) to MSB (Most significant bit) i.e., from left to right. The total number of
data bits in frame is 7.Parity bit is used for parity checking. Even, odd and no parity can
be used depending on the configuration of the system. The default parity checking mode
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is even parity checking. The stop bit indicates the end of the message. In general if there
is no-parity, an additional stop bit is added to the bit sequence.

Start
Bit
Figure 2.7
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3

Data Bits
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7

Stop
8(MSB) Bit

Stop
Bit

The RTU Bit Sequence(No Parity Bit)

The maximum size of the RTU Message frame is 256 bytes. Each RTU frame is
transmitted with a start and stop point. The interval between each frame is 3.5 char,
which helps the devices to identify the start and stop of the message. If the interval is less
than or equal to 1.5char, the message is incomplete and discarded by the receiver. The
entire message is transmitted as a continuous stream of characters. The RTU message
frame consists of the following fields: slave address, function code, data and CRC.
Slave address is 1 byte in length and gives details about to which slave the
message is addressed. Data field contains the actual data of message. Cyclic redundancy
check method field is sub divided into two fields: CRC (Low) and CRC (High).The value
of CRC is independent of parity checking method applied and does not include stop, start
bits in its calculation. The CRC is calculated at both transmission and receiving devices.
The ASCII mode is used in the communications when the RTU mode cannot be
implemented. In this mode, each 8 bit byte is sent as two ASCII characters. The bit
sequence of the ASCII mode is shown in the figure 2.9.
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The RTU Message Format
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ASCII Bit Sequence(Parity Bit)

The Start bit in the bit sequence indicates the start of message. The data bits
consist of actual data to be transmitted. The data is transmitted from LSB (Least
Significant Bit) to MSB (Most significant bit) i.e., from left to right. The number of data
bits is 7. This bit is used for parity checking. Even, odd and no parity can be used
depending on the configuration of the system. The default parity checking mode is even
parity checking. The stop bit indicates the end of the message. An additional bit is added
to the bit sequence if no-parity checking mode is applied.

Start
Bit
Figure 2.10
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ASCII Bit Sequence(No Parity Bit)

The maximum size of the ASCII message is 513 characters. Each RTU frame is
transmitted with a start and stop point. In the ASCII mode, a message should start with
colon (:) character (ASCII 3A HEX) and the end with carriage return and line feed
(CRLF pair)(0D0A).The devices monitor continuously for the colon. when the colon is
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received, the device decodes the next characters until the end of the frame is obtained. In
the LRC field in the ASCII message holds the calculated LRC values. The LRC value is
calculated by the transmit device and appended at the end of the message. The device that
receives recalculates the LRC and cross checks it with the actual LRC value. LRC
calculation does not include the start and stop bits.

Start

Address

Function
code

Data

LRC

Stop bit

1 char

2 chars

2 chars

02*252chars

2 chars

1 char

Figure 2.11

ASCII Message Format

MODBUS function codes are the elements of the MODBUS request/reply PDUs.
MODBUS function codes are divided in to three categories: public function codes, Userdefined function codes and reserved function codes. Public function codes are unique,
well documented, publicly documented and validated by the MODBUS-IDA community.
There are three ranges of the public function codes, i.e.1-65, and 72-100 and from 110127 decimal. User-defined Function Codes are user defined and not supported by the
specification. There are two ranges of the user-defined function codes, i.e.65 to 72 and
from 100 to 110 decimal. Reserved Function Codes are not part of the specification and
range from 128-255. The format of reserved function code is function code/sub function
code or just function code. All the sub function codes ranging from 0-255 are reserved.
The differences between the both MODBUS transmission modes: MODBUS
ASCII and MODBUS RTU are listed in the table 2.1.
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Table 2.1

Differences Between ASCII and RTU Modes

ASCII
Messages are in readable format

RTU
Messages are in binary coding and cannot
be read.
It allows a time gap of 1 second between Continuous streams of messages are sent
the bytes of message.
The start and end of the message are
A minimum gap of 3.5 char is present to
identified with special characters like
indicate the start of each message.
semi colon(:), and CR/LF combination
The bandwidth utilization in this mode
The bandwidth utilization is less than the
is twice that of RTU mode.
ASCII mode
Thus, MODBUS is the SCADA protocol used for serial communication and can
be operated in two modes: MODBUS ASCII and MODBUS RTU.
2.4.2

DNP3 Protocol
Distributed network Protocol (DNP3) is an open standard protocol [13]. It was

developed by Harris, Distributed Automation Products. This Protocol is widely accepted
communication protocol in SCADA systems. These involve acquiring the information
and sending information between physically separate devices. The DNP3 protocol is used
to transmit relatively small packets of data in reliable manner compared to general
purpose protocols such as FTP, which can send large files.DNP3 is widely used in oil &
gas, waste water and security industries. The DNP3 offers a wide range features such as
time stamping of the message, time synchronization, supports peer to peer topology,
multiple master topology, secure file transfers and many more[14].
DNP3 uses the enhanced performance architecture model developed by the IEC
technical committee [15].The EPA model uses two hardware layer, two software layers
and application layer. DNP3 uses the three layers of the EPA model and adds some extra
transport functions. The layers in the DNP3 are the following:
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Application layer
Limited transport
Limited Network
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-transport

Datalink
Physical
Figure 2.12

DNP3 Enhanced Performance Architecture Model

The physical layer defines the physical interface characteristics in terms of
electrical specifications, timing, pin-outs etc. The standard recommended physical layer
standards for DNP3 are 8 data bits, 1 start bit, 1 stop bit, no parity and Rs232C voltage
levels and control signals. The data link layer provides for the reliable transmission of
data across the physical medium. The main features of the DNP3 data link layer are
frame synchronization, multiplexing, data fragmentation, error Checking and also
supports multiple masters and peer to peer communicationsDNP3 have a Pseudotransport layer which supports the functions of both network and transport layer. The
network layer provides the functions like flow control and routing of the network packets.
The transport layer supports the function like message assembling and disassembling
functions, error correction etc.
The DNP3 application layer has following features such as secure File Transfer,
Date and Time Synchronization and also supports the polling based on the data priority.
The DNP3 is particularly developed for SCADA systems. It is designed to optimize the
data acquisition and control commands transmission between the devices. The DNP3
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have the following advantages such as high data integrity, minimized Overhead, robust,
efficient, secure and self-Compatible.
Thus the MODBUS and DNP3 are mostly commonly used industry SCADA
protocols in the SCADA systems. The SCADA data logger supports above two protocols:
MODBUS in ASCII mode, MODBUS in RTU mode and DNP3.
2.5

Attacks on SCADA systems
SCADA systems are first developed to meet the basic requirements of the control

systems, where security has less importance. However, the increase in the demand for
connectivity between a SCADA and other networks components like internet and
corporate network exposed the critical parts of SCADA to the public. Threats can come
from numerous sources such as malicious intruders, disgruntled employees, equipment
failures etc. Some of the potential attacks against SCADA system are such as, response
injection, command injection and denial of service Data and control injection [16].
First attack is response injection, this kind of attack involves injecting false
responses into a control system. In the control systems, the processes are dependent on
the feedback control loop which monitors physical process data before making control
decisions, protecting the integrity of the sensor measurements from the physical process
is critical. So injection of the false responses makes the control algorithms and operators
or dispatchers to take a false decision. In this attack, the attacker impersonates as slave
and sends fake responses to the master and forces it to take false decisions. Second attack
is command injection attack in which false controls commands are injected in to control
system. In this kind of attack, the attackers impersonates himself/herself as master to
slaves and makes an attempt to issue false command control to the control the operations
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of slaves. Generally, the remote terminals and intelligent electronic devices are
programmed to monitor automatically and control the physical process directly at the
remote sites. The ladder logic and c language are available programming language to
program the remote terminals and intelligent electronic devices. Even the attacker can
make an attempt to issue control commands to change or overwrite the ladder logic and c
programs running on the remote terminal devices.
Third type of attack is denial of service is a kind of attack in which the making the
system unresponsive and unavailable to the other systems. In the SCADA system, both
the master and slaves can be attacked using this attack. In the both cases, the one
component becomes unresponsive and unavailable to other component. One example of
denial of service are flooding the system with continuous requests and making the system
unavailable for other illegitimate requests. An attack is documented which occurred in
Bellingham in 1991[17]. In this case, 250, 000 gallons of gasoline is leaked in to streams
and later created explosion, because at the time of incident the total control system
became unresponsive and not able to control the pressure relief value. The reasons for the
failure is not known due unavailability of the data logging schemes in the control system
In all the above mentioned attacks the attacker first sniffs the data transmitted
over the network and gains some confidential information from the network. This is
possible in the SCADA network because the SCADA network communications are not
unencrypted. Using this data, the attacker establishes the connection between the master
and slave and acts as man in middle. The configuration for the attack is shown in the
figure 2.13.
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Master

Attacker
Figure 2.13

Communication with and without attacker

Figure 2.13 shows the normal communications between the master and slave in
the absence of attacker and communication with attacker as man in middle. As man in
middle, the attackers impersonates himself/herself as master to the slave and as a slave to
the master. Now the attacker can send false data to master faking the readings and
responses from the slave (Response Injection Attack) and even he can make the changes
in the control message from master to slave which may cause malfunctioning of the
devices (Command Injection Attack). The malfunctioning of the devices and false
readings from the slaves might ultimately effect the over functioning of the control
system. Even the attacker can launch denial of service attacks and make the one system
unavailable/unresponsive to other systems. Thus a solid security strategy should be
developed to prevent these attacks on SCADA system and safeguard the national
property.
2.6

Mississippi State University (MSU) SCADA Security laboratory
The Mississippi State University (MSU) SCADA Security Laboratory was used to

validate the data logger. The MSU SCADA security laboratory consists of two masters
24

and five slaves. This laboratory was designed and constructed using actual commercial
control system components representative of those found in general use within the critical
infrastructure. The MSU SCADA Security laboratory itself is configured to model a gas
pipeline operation, an industrial blower (such as found in mining applications), a
conveyor belt operation, a municipal water tower, and an oil/gas storage facility as slaves
and two HMI interfaces to control these slaves. The master and slaves stations use
MODBUS and DNP3 protocols to communicate with each other. Both the master and
slaves can be operated in the two modes of MODBUS i.e., ASCII and RTU modes. The
transmission medium used in the laboratory is 900 MHz free wave radios[18], RS232 and
Ethernet. The software configuration of the laboratory contains of Allen-bradley
RSLogix 500 Programming software [19], Telepace [20], SCADAPack Programming
software [21] and iFIX PC monitoring and control software [22]. The SCADA main
station and other slaves connected to it have SCADAPack lightPLC, Freewave 900 MHZ
radios and requires a power supply of 24VDC.
The overview of the MSU SCADA Security Laboratory including the description
about the master and slaves configuration is explained below. Figure 2.14 shows the HMI
interface of complete laboratory setup at the master end. The two masters are used to
control the slaves connected to them. Both the masters communicate with the slaves
using freewave 900MHZ radios.
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Figure 2.14

The Human Machine Interface

The iFIX PC monitoring and control software is installed on the Laboratory PC to
see the pictorial representation of complete system. Using iFIX PC monitoring and
control software, the operator at master end can control the operation of all slaves. The
HMI software is capable of monitoring and controlling all slaves simultaneously and
individually. Various parameters of the slaves can be controlled by the HMI interface. If
the communications is Lost between the HMI and slaves, the slave RTU continues to
function with the last set of parameters provided by the HMI. When the control system is
operated based on the MODBUS protocol, the lab supports both the unicast mode and
broadcast mode. In the unicast mode, the master communicates with only single at a time,
whereas in the broad cast mode the master sends out request commands to all the slaves
connected it at same time.
The slaves connected to the two masters are gas pipeline operation, an industrial
blower, a conveyor belt operation, a municipal water tower, and an oil/gas storage
facility.
First, the gas pipeline system is model of the industrial pipeline transportation
used for transporting the gas and liquids. Figure 2.15 (a) shows the gas pipeline control
system model the lab and (b) shows the representation of the gas pipeline control system
26

on HMI interface The mock gas pipeline control system consists of a gas pipeline, a
pump, a sensor to read the pressure values, and an actuator to control the pressure relief
value. This gas pipeline slave communicates with master using free wave 900 MHz
radios. The pressure level in the pipeline is maintained between the maximum and
minimum parameters values which RTU holds The RTU continually measures the
pressure and sends updates of pressure values to the master at regular intervals.

b

a
Figure 2.15

b

The Gas Pipeline Control System

The slave can be operated in two modes: manual and automatic mode. In the
automatic mode, the on/off of motor is controlled automatically depending on the
pressure values. For example, if the pressure reaches the threshold value, the master
issues a command to turn off the motor. In manual mode, the motor is controlled by the
operator depending on the pressure value. Using the HMI interface, the various
operations such as open and close the pressure relief value, set maximum and minimum
parameters turn off and on the entire system.
Second, the industrial blower is the model of the blowers used in the mining
applications. Figure 2.16 (a) shows the industrial blower control system model the lab
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and (b) shows the representation of the industrial blower control system on HMI
interface. The mock blower system consists of air evacuation tube, a pump, air flow
sensor and an actuator to open an air duct. The RTU controls the air conduct and pump to
maintain air flow.

b

a

Figure 2.16

b

The Industrial Blower Control System

The pressure value in the tube is continually reported by the salve to master at
regular intervals. The HMI monitors and displays airflow of the system on the operator’s
PC screen. The blower can be operated in both manual and automatic mode.
Third, the conveyer belt model is similar to industrial conveyer model used in
many industries for material handling, transporting various industrial and agricultural
products. Figure 2.17 (a) shows the conveyer belt control system model the lab and (b)
shows the representation of the conveyer belt control system on HMI interface. The
conveyer belt system in the lab consists of three conveyer belts, diverter, photo eye and
pucks (black and white) and used to sort the pucks by color.
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b

a

Figure 2.17

b

The Conveyer Belt Control System

The conveyer belts can be operated in both clock wise and anti clock wise
directions. The photo eye is used to detect the color of puff and diverter is used to
separate the puffs based on their color. The HMI monitors the sensor values and uses
conveyor belt speed to display the approximate location of the pucks on the conveyor
belt. This system can also be operated in automatic mode and manual mode in which the
operator takes control the system and controls the sorting operation.
Fourth, the municipal water tower models a water tower used in water distribution
systems.

b

a
Figure 2.18

b

The Municipal Water Tower Control System
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Figure 2.18 (a) shows the municipal water tower control system model the lab and
(b) shows the representation of the municipal water tower control system on HMI
interface. The mock water tower in the lab consists of the elevated water tank, water
pump, air flow sensor, and water level sensors mounted at four different levels on the
elevated water tank. The sensors inside the water tank updates about the level of water in
the tank The RTU makes an attempt to maintain water between the 2 middle water sensor
levels by turning on and off the water pump. If the water reaches either the highest sensor
level or lower sensor level then alarms are triggered on the HMI. Depending upon the
level of water in the tank, the process of turning water pump on/off is controlled in both
the automatic and manual modes.
The last model in the lab is oil/gas storage unit. This model represents actual
industrial oil/gas storage tanks. Figure 2.19 (a) shows the oil/gas storage control system
model in the MSU SCADA Security lab and (b) shows the representation of the
municipal water tower control system on HMI interface.

b

a
Figure 2.19

b

The Oil/Gas Storage Control systems
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The mock oil storage system consists of oil storage tank, a pump and sensors
monitoring the levels of oil/gas in the tank. The RTU contains HI and LO oil level
parameters and attempts to maintain the oil level between those limits. The HMI interface
consists if HI/HI and LO/LO level parameters and alarms are triggered if the oil level
reaches the HI/HI or LO/LO levels. This system can also be operated in both automatic
and manual modes.
Thus the MSU SCADA security laboratory is model of SCADA system similar to
the industry and was used to validate the working of the SCADA data logger.
2.7

Summary
This chapter introduced all the basics and background information related to

SCADA system, protocols used in the communication between the master and slaves, and
various attacks on the SCADA system. Details about a MSU SCADA Security laboratory
are also introduced in this chapter.
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CHAPTER III
DATA LOGGING IN SCADA NETWORKS
3.1

Introduction
This chapter explains details about general data logging, the need of data logging

in the SCADA networks and functional structure of the SCADA data logger. Need for
integrity and confidentiality requirements in the implementation of the data logger and
ways to achieve the requirements are explained in this chapter.
Data logging is the measurement and recording of parameters over a period of
time such as network traffic, temperature, humidity, light, pressure, voltage, power etc
[23]. The main idea behind the data logging concept is to store the information for future
references and analysis. For example, the black box in the airplane is a data logging
device. It collects all the parameters related to plane performance. This collected
information can be used later performance analysis and details about failures of devices.
SCADA control systems may have highly involved master nodes in which the
master continually polls RTU and IED for sensor data and directly controls the process or
control may be distributed to downstream RTU/IED which control the process. Control
systems are typically networked control system specific communication protocols such as
MODBUS and DNP3. MODBUS and DNP3 are carried on various physical layers
including RS-232, RS-485, Ethernet, and many proprietary radio solutions. These
systems are more prone to attacks at several points in the network such at RTU level,
HMI etc. Many documented attacks cannot provide the exact evidence for the cause of
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the attacks. So a data logging scheme is required for the SCADA system which can log
the network transactions and use this data in the later post forensic analysis of various
incidents. SCADA control system data loggers should be able to monitor and log
communications traffic in the network to allow an intrusion detection tool to analyze
logged network traffic and detect unauthorized penetrations. The major function of the
SCADA data logger is not only limited to the logging the data and storing it, but also to
protect the logged data to support the post forensic analysis. The requirements of SCADA
data logger such as data integrity and data confidentiality ensure the data stored by the
data logger is secure. To meet the above requirements, HMAC with SHA1 as underlying
function is use to provide the data integrity and data confidentiality is achieved using the
encryption function (AES operating Counter Mode). The HMAC SHA1 and AES –CTR
functions are implemented by the SCADA data logger and safeguard the logged data for
later forensic analysis.
3.2

Data logging in SCADA Network
The SCADA control data loggers should monitor and log all communication

traffic to and fro from the master (MTU) and slave (). Unauthorized penetration of
SCADA control systems may happen at many points. Various attacks on SCADA
systems are explained in section 2.6. For example, RTU and IED communication
network can be penetrate. It is common for control systems to use radio communications
to connect master to RTU over large distances. Often these radio connections are
unencrypted connections with no access control. Intruders with matching radio
equipment may access control systems via these radio links and take control of the
RTU/IED and may lead to devastating consequences on the control system operation. An
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exploit of this type has been documented in [24] and involves response injection attack
and denial of service attacks. In this exploit, attacker uses a radio and connects as a rogue
slave to master. The rogue slave is able to communicate with master and can monitor the
communications between the master and other slaves. By using the denial of service
attack, the network is flooded with continuous data. As a result, the other slaves are
unable to communicate with MTU at this moment. During this period, if a critical
situations such increase in pressure value, overflow of the oil etc occurs at the slave end,
then the MTU cannot control the situation as the communication is lost and results in
huge damages. Therefore it is necessary to log network transactions both at upstream and
downstream of the SCADA network actions. Typical RTU and IED do not have storage
capability to log their actions and they also commonly do not have processor resources
available to dedicate to the logging function. Generally, the upstream control system has
high processing computers, workstations and a huge database known as historian. The
historian does not store the information related to the network transactions, but it stores
information about login failures, business documents etc. Hence to overcome the various
kinds of attacks, the SCADA data logger is implemented on two platforms: virtual
machine platform and embedded system platform.
In [25] Chandia et al. a forensic architecture for the SCADA network is proposed
which captures the network traffic at various locations. The exact location of various
forensic agents is not addressed. Our architecture aims at placing the data loggers in
different locations to complete capture network transactions in the SCADA system.
Figure 3.1 shows the architecture of the SCADA control system with SCADA
data logger retrofits. This placement of data loggers showed in the figure will capture all
the network transactions along with traffic associated with response injection, command
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injection and denial of service attacks mentioned in the section 2.5.The SCADA data
loggers are placed in two locations. First, a virtual machine data logger is running on the
HMI in the figure will capture the network traffic associated with the response injection
attacks and denial of service attacks on MTU. The response injections and denial of
service attacks may originate from an attacker who penetrated the communication link
between the MTU and RTU. An attack of this type on a wireless communications is
demonstrated in [24].

RTU/
IED

ControlCenter
Historian

HMI

MTU
RTU/
IED

= SCADA Datalogger

Serial communication Link

Figure 3.1

SCADA Architecture With Retrofit Data loggers

Second, the embedded platform data logger is placed in the downstream and is
attached to the RTU/IED. The data logger is connected in the bump-in–wire
configuration. This placement of data logger helps in capturing the network traffic
associated with command injection and denial of service attack on RTU/IED. The
command injection attacks may originate from a penetration of the corporate network via
internet or from an insider and from a attacker who penetrated in to the communication
link between the MTU and RTU/IED. The data logger attached to the RTU/IED will
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capture the network transaction related to command injection attack and denial of service
on RTU/IED. This placement of data logger helps in logging all the transactions, such as
if the system is configured to communicate with MODBUS protocol, it supports both the
broadcast mode and unicast mode. In this unicast mode, the master communicates with a
single slave at a time and includes both request from the MTU and response from
RTU/IED. The data loggers placed at two points is able to log the both response and
request. Similarly, in the broadcast mode the MTU communicates with all the RTU/IED
connected it and includes only the request from the MTU. Even in this case, the data
loggers are able to log the transactions successfully. Thus, the SCADA data logger
implemented on the virtual machine platform data logger running as the Linux process on
the HMI host and embedded platform data logger connected to the downstream elements
can efficiently capture the network transactions between the MTU and RTU/IED and
stores the transactions for future post forensic analysis.
3.3

Functional Structure of SCADA Data Logger
Figure 3.2 shows the general functional structure of the Data logger. In general,

the major blocks of the data logging system are the data acquisition, logging and storage,
offline analysis, online analysis and display [26].Whereas, the major blocks of the
SCADA data logger are data acquisition, logging and storage and offline analysis. At
present, online analysis and display functions of general data logger are not supported by
the SCADA data logger. This functional structure is common for both the embedded
system platform and virtual machine platform data loggers.
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General Functional Structure of SCADA Data Logger

The functions of each functional block of SCADA data logger is explained below.
First, functional block of the SCADA data logger is data acquisition. The data acquisition
is a process of acquiring data from the physical world and sending data to the system to
process it. The data acquisition in the SCADA data logger is achieved using the UARTs.
UART(s) will collect the traffic between the control system nodes and RTU. Many
physical layer connections are available to establish the connection between the master
nodes and downstream nodes such as ethernet, RS-232/RS-485.Our data logger design
supports RS-232 and RS-485 physical layer connections.
Second functional block of the SCADA data logger is logging and storage. The
logging and storage blocks are essential in every data-logging system. Some of the
common storage media used is floppy disks, tape drives, network drives, RAID drives
and etc. Software plays a vital role in determining the efficiency of the data logging
systems, because well developed software determines the storage format, efficient
utilization of the memory space on the disk and other factors like writing time, reading
time. In general the efficiency of the data logger is dependent on the storage format. The
common storage formats available are ASCII text files, binary files and data bases.
ASCII text files are the common, flexible and compatible format for storage. These files
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do not utilize the disk space efficiently and used only for slow data acquisition systems.
Binary files are the efficient method of data storage. In this format the raw bytes are
stored are stored which takes less space and less processor overhead. This format can be
used in fast data acquisition models. Data bases are the most ideal storage format,
because of their organized and structured format. Additional features such as data
backup, fast data retrieval and inserting etc are supported by the databases.
In SCADA data logger, the logging and storing software in the SCADA data
logger is developed by using c language. On the embedded platform, the logging and
store software uses the memory card (1 GB compact flash card) for storing the data and
later the data can be retrieved from the card. Whereas in the case of virtual machine
platform, the transactions are stored on the drive space available on the PC.As the logged
data by the data logger should be protected securely to support the post forensic analysis.
The software also implements cryptographic algorithms to sign and encrypt the data. The
HMAC SHA 1 is used to sign the data and verifies the data integrity and authenticity of
the data and the AES operating in counter mode ensures the data confidentiality. The
SCADA data logger also supports the time stamping of the data for temporal analysis in
offline analysis and to support the offline analysis in future. The storage format supported
by the SCADA data logger is ASCII text file and in future the storage format can be
extended to support the binary and databases. The software opens each log file for every
transaction and also maintains the track of log files opened in one master file.
Third functional structural block of the SCADA data logger is offline analysis.
Offline analysis is process of performing analysis on the data that is acquired and stored.
This process involves the extraction of data from the logged data using several functions
such as mathematical functions, cryptographic functions etc. Some of the offline analysis
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types are applying basic statistics functions on the data, identifying the false data,
classification of data etc. In SCADA data logger, the process of offline analysis involves
the extraction of original data from the acquired and stored data. In the SCADA data
logger, data retrieval is carried out in different ways such as master directly polls the data
logger to access the data, read directly from the flash card and logon as user on the PC
based data logger to gain access to the data. After the data is retrieved from the storage,
several operations such as decrypting the message, recalculating the MAC value,
comparing the MAC values (stored and calculated) are performed on the data.
The next functional component of a typical data logging system is online analysis.
In general, the online analysis is accomplished using commercial software and requires
high resources. Alarming, event management, intrusion detection are some of the
functions of online analysis. At present the online analysis is not supported by the
SCADA data logger. Online analysis can be implemented on the data logger as a future
work. The online analysis helps in actively analyzing and capturing the transactions. The
online analysis reduces the number of packets which must be stored in the data logger
memory and helps in efficient utilization of the memory available.
The last function of the data logging is to support display. The main aim of the
display function is to view the data acquired by the data logger. Generally, data is
classified in to two types: live data and historical data. Live data is data that is viewed
while it is acquired by the data logger whereas the historical data is data that is previously
acquired by the data logger and stored in the memory. The display function has very less
importance in the SCADA network, because generally the RTU and field devices are
located in the remote areas where human access is mostly restricted. Thus viewing the
live data is not possible at those locations. However, display of the historical data is
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supported by the SCADA data logger. Thus, the functional structure of the SCADA data
logger and functions associated with each block is explained.
3.4

Importance of Data Integrity and Data Confidentiality
The SCADA data logger uses cryptography techniques to achieve the data

integrity and data confidentiality requirements of the SCADA data logger. As mentioned
before, the SCADA data logger used the concept of signing (HMACSHA1) and
encrypting (AES-CTR) of data are used by the SCADA data logger to protect the data
and overcome different various attacks. Some of the possible attacks on the storage
devices (Flash cards and hard drives) are data manipulation, data insertion etc. The data
logger acquires the network transactions from the network, timestamps the data, signs,
encrypts the data and finally stores the data. The logged data is used for post forensic
analysis. Among various available techniques SCADA data logger uses the techniques
such as HMAC with SHA 1 as underlying function to sign the data and AES in counter
mode is used to encrypt the data. The stored transaction on the storage device is
encrypted data consists of the original message, nonce and message authentication code
(MAC). The input for the HMAC-SHA1 is the concatenated data of original transaction,
timestamp and nonce. The MAC value is output values from the HMAC-SHA1 function
As the transactions is encrypted using AES operating counter mode ensures the data
confidentiality and HMAC-SHA1 guarantees the property of data integrity and data
authenticity.
The main advantage of adding cryptographic techniques such signing and
encryption is to protect the data on the storage devices securely. First, let consider the
data logging without applying any cryptographic features to protect the data. In this
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scenario, the data logger acquires data, timestamps the data and finally stores data on the
storage devices. So the storage device consists of only raw network transactions with just
timestamp value appended to it. If an attacker gains access over the storage devices,
he/her can perform several attacks such as manipulating the existing transactions, adding
the new transactions, deleting some field values in the transactions etc. Later when the
post forensic analysis is performed, there are no chances of finding the fake data
resembling the original transactions. Thus, to overcome the various attacks on the storage
devices and support the post forensic analysis, the data logger implementation considers
data integrity and data confidentiality as important requirements.
Next, let us consider the data logging which involves cryptographic features such
as signing and encryption. In this case, the data logger acquires the network transactions,
timestamps the data, signs, encrypts the data and finally stores the data on the storage
devices. So the data stored on the storage device is in encrypted form. If an attacker gains
access over the storage devices, there is no chance of data manipulation or data insertion
etc as the data is in encrypted form. By any chance if the attacker is able to manipulate
the data or insert the new data on the storage device, then the signing helps in identifying
the original data and fake data. Because, when data is retrieved back from the storage
device, first operation of decryption is performed on the data and next the MAC value is
recalculated. The comparison between the computed MAC after the retrieval and stored
MAC helps to distinguish between the original transactions and fake transactions. First, if
the MAC computed tails with the stored MAC value, then it ensures that data is not
manipulated and original transaction is safe. Next, if the MAC computed after the
retrieval from the storage device differs from the stored MAC, then the transactions is
considered as fake data and is discarded. Thus, the requirements data integrity and data
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confidentiality plays vital role in the designing of the SCADA data logger and protecting
the data securely.
3.5

Summary
This chapter presents an overview of data logging and various cryptographic

techniques used in the implementation of the SCADA data logger. The importance of the
data logging in SCADA networks and the functional structure of SCADA data logger are
explained in this chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
SCADA DATA LOGGER ARCHITECTURE
4.1

Introduction
This chapter explains the motivation behind the development of the SCADA data

logger, related works and proposed SCADA Data logger architecture. Both architecture
on PC and embedded platforms are explained with block diagrams. The major
requirements of the data logger and ways of achieving them, details about the software
architecture and components on the embedded platform are also explained in this chapter.
4.2

Motivation
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) is a common set of

electronic control systems used to manage complex and potentially dangerous process.
Typically SCADA control system has MTU (Master Terminal Unit) which monitors and
controls the downstream nodes called Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) and intelligent
electronic devices (IED). The maser, RTU and IED nodes re networked with MODBUS
and DNP3 protocols which over leased lines, dial up phones, radio and internet. SCADA
wireless and telephony based communications are often vulnerable to intrusion. Such
intrusions are possible because of limited access control capabilities, SCADA operator
tendency to use default communication configurations, and the tendency to leave
configurations unchanged over long periods of time. Such vulnerabilities have led to at
least one documented attack which occurred in Australia in 2000 [5]. In this case, a
disgruntled former employee used radio equipment to access and controls multiple
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sewage plant control system throughout the country. The attacker modified control
system RTU to create waste water leaks which ultimately led to over 200,000 gallons of
raw sewage into local rivers leaking into local fresh water sources. Because the attacker
in this case was accessing the control system RTU with no data logging capabilities over
a communication channel unknown to the system operators his accesses went completely
undetected and unlogged. If all communications to the penetrate RTU had been logged
operators would have easily known an outsider was accessing the system after the initial
leaks were detected because logged communication at the RTU would not match log
transmissions from known master nodes. Without data logging at the RTU, the actual
case, engineers were baffled by the leaks and took 3 years to learn the true source of the
problem. Ultimately, the attacker was found after a tip led authorities to search the
attacker home, at which time they found the radio equipment used to carry out attacks.
Hence there is a need of a SCADA data logger which can captures all the traffic to
prevent attacks on the SCADA system and use this logged information for later forensics
analysis.
4.3

Related Works
In [25] Chandia et al. propose a forensic architecture which can be used to capture

SCADA control system communications for subsequent forensic analysis. In the Chandia
architecture, agents capture data at three levels and forward collected traffic to a data
warehouse for storage and future analysis. Level 1 agents collect communications to and
from the control system master nodes. Level 2 agents collect traffic at intermediate
locations in the network. Finally, level 3 agents collect communication traffic from
downstream nodes such as RTU and IED. The level 1, 2, and 3 agents capture network
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traffic and create synopses of the network packets according to a set of predefined
configuration rules. Each synopsis contains a time stamp and location details required for
the forensic analysis. The level agents forward the synopsis packets to the data warehouse
which is located in the upstream network. The data warehouse analyzes each synopsis
packet and creates a data signature, which is stored along with the synopsis. The date
warehouse supports queries on the stored data. All the communications between the data
warehouse and level agents occur on an isolated side channel network. The proposed
architecture with level agents and data warehouse is not able to characterize the position
of level agent3 in downstream. Chandia et al. do not specify the exact location, intended
behavior, or architecture of their level 3 agents. The level 3 agent is most similar to our
data logger architecture in that it collects communication at downstream nodes.
Snort is a rule based open source network intrusion detection tool [27]. Snort
collects and logs network traffic, analyzes network traffic searching for rule violations,
and alerts the administrator of suspicious activity. Snort is commonly used to monitor
Ethernet and TCP/IP communications traffic. Rule sets have also been developed to
allow snort to monitor and analyze MODBUS and DNP3 traffic between master nodes
and RTU/IED. Such implementations can be used on the master nodes where sufficient
processing resources are available to run snort. RTU and IED do not typically have the
processing power or the storage capabilities to support Snort.
At present, in market some control system vendors are manufacturing the RTU
supporting the data logging feature. But, this RTU developed by the vendors supports
user to log the data from the RTU to external store device. They does not supports feature
of logging the network transactions and use in later post forensic analysis. For example,
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Control Micro system, Inc [28] offers two SCADA RTU devices with data logging
functionality, but they does not log the network transactions in the SCADA systems.
4.4

SCADA Data logger Requirements
The SCADA data logger is implemented to capture all traffic at RTU level and is

places at downstream. It is implemented on both the platforms: the PC platform and
embedded platform (FPGA).Various SCADA protocols such as MODBUS ASCII,
MODBUS RTU and DNP3 are supported by the Data logger. Many requirements are
defined for the SCADA data logger and successfully achieved them through
implementation, validation of data logger.
The requirements of the SCADA data logger operating on both PC and embedded
platform are shown in the Table 4.1. A data logging system must acquire data, log and
store the data, provide a mechanism for active or online analysis, provide a mechanism
for offline analysis, include mechanisms to ensure data integrity, be continuously
available to log data at the rate transactions occur on the monitored medium, compatible
to a1l platforms (Virtual machine and Embedded) and protect the privacy of the stored
data etc.The first requirement of the SCADA data logger is support the bump-in-wire
configuration. Many SCADA systems operating today are deployed decades ago with a
major concern to control the critical processes in the control systems. The security of
these systems is not considered at the time of deployment. Thus these systems are
vulnerable to a variety of attacks, leading to huge damage due to the failures of critical
infrastructures.
The lifetime of the various SCADA equipments spans several years from the
installations (20 to 50 years) and replacing this equipment with new ones incur huge costs
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and is not economically infeasible. Hence, the economic solution is to connect the
security retrofit devices in bump-in wire configuration to these legacy systems and
achieve the required features such as security etc. The SCADA data logger is a security
retrofit module connected in the bump-in-wire configuration. As the data logger is
connected in the bump-in wire configuration, it makes the data logger to be active with
network. Being active with network helps the data logger to support the active analysis
and integrate the intrusion detection system (IDS) with the SCADA data logger.
The second requirement of the SCADA data logger is support the post forensic
analysis. The SCADA systems are vulnerable to a variety of attacks and reasons for the
attacks are unknown from the post forensic analysis. For example in the case of two
documented attacks, one in Australia in 2001 [5] and another incident in Bellingham[
17].The investigation to find the reasons of attack took long time and the exact reasons
for the attacks are unknown due to lack of proper data logging facility. Thus, the
SCADA data logger supports the post forensic analysis as it logs all the communication
traffic between the master and slave. To support the post forensic analysis, the data
logger should protect the data logged safely and securely. To safeguard the data, the data
logger acquires the data, timestamps the data, both the operations of signing and
encryption are performed on the data and finally stores the data. The time stamping of
data helps in finding the time of incident occurrence and the signing of data, encrypting
data ensures the cryptographic properties such as data integrity and data privacy
respectively.
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Table 4.1

SCADA Data Logger Requirements

Requirement
1
2

3
4

Bump-in-wire
retrofit
Support Post
forensic analysis

Platform
Compatible
Protocol
Independent

5

Harmless

6

Data Acquisition

7

Log Data

8

Store Data

9

Offline analysis

10

Support Active
analysis

The data logger should be able to fit legacy SCADA system
in bump –in- wire configuration
The stored data on the data logger should help in post
forensic analysis and thus the protection of the data is highly
required, which achieved using signing and encrypting the
data.
The data logger should be compatible to work on both the
PC and embedded platforms
The data logger should be independent of the SCADA
protocol used in the SCADA communications i.e Modbus
and DNP3
The security retrofit module should not affect the normal
function of the control system
This requirement ensures that the complete transactions
between the master and slave are acquired.
This helps in time stamping the network transactions while
acquiring, signing and encrypting the data.
The process of storing data involves the selection of the
storage media depending on the type of platform used for
data logger, size of memory etc
This involves the extraction of data from the stored
transactions using cryptographic techniques
The bump-in wire configuration makes the data logger
active with network, which helps in supporting the active
analysis in future

The third requirement of the SCADA data logger is it should be compatible to
work on the PC in virtual environment and embedded platforms. The SCADA data logger
implemented works on the virtual machine platform and embedded platform. The same
software code works for the both platforms except a few changes in the hardware
abstraction layer. First, the virtual machine version data logger is used to log the network
transactions in the upstream component such as HMI. This version is implemented in
such way that it can run as a Linux process on the same PC which hosts HMI. The virtual
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machine platform data logger can efficiently log the network transactions related to
response injection and denial of service attacks on MTU.
Second, the embedded platform data logger is connected to the downstream
components (RTU/IED). Generally, the RTU/IED has very little processing power,
memory storage and is not able to support to the logging facility. So this embedded
platform can be added as the retrofit to the downstream components to log the network
transactions. The SCADA data logger is connected to the RTU/IED in a bump-in-wire
configuration and adds the logging facility at the downstream (RTU/IED) level. This
placement of the data logger at level can efficiently logs the network transactions related
to command injection and denial of service attacks on s. Thus the SCADA data logger is
compatible with virtual machine platform and embedded platform.
The fourth requirement is SCADA data logger is to independent of the
communication protocol used. In SCADA system, the master, RTU and IED
communicate with standard protocols such as MODBUS and DNP3.All the components
should be configured to communicate over a single protocol. For example, a master
configured to work on MODBUS protocol issues MODBUS commands and only the
slave which operates on same protocol responses back to the commands from master. An
external device connected to the SCADA system should be able to support these
protocols. The SCADA data logger supports both the protocols MODBUS and DNP3.It
also supports the MODBUS RTU mode and MODBUS ASCII mode operation. Thus, the
SCADA mode is protocol independent and supports all the SCADA protocols
(MODBUS and DNP3).
The fifth requirement of the SCADA Data logger is being harmless. The data
logger should not impede the functionality of the control system process being
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monitored. The SCADA data logger is active with network. As a result the
communications between the master and slave passes through the data logger and cause
little delay. But still the overall control system functioning is not affected by adding the
data logger in bump in wire configuration. Generally, in the SCADA systems, the master
starts communication with a command and slave responds to the command. The master
waits for some specified amount time depending on the type of the control system. For
example, in electric sub stations, the master polls for every 2-4 seconds and in our MSU
SCADA Security Laboratory the master polls for every 1 sec. If the response does not
arrive within the time limit, the master issues a new command to slave. Thus any retrofit
that fits in the bump-in-wire configuration between the master and slave adds latency, but
it should be able to deliver the commands and response within time limit.
The effect of the SCADA data logger on the control system in terms of the
latency delay is explained below. The figure explains the difference in communication
with and without SCADA data logger. From the figure, let t1 be the time at with the
master send the command (cmd1) to slave and t2 is the time at which the response (Res1)
reaches the masters from the slave. The difference between the master and slave gives the
round trip latency (t2-t1) and the master issues another command after it gets the
response. This process continues between the master and slave at regular intervals. By
adding the SCADA data logger to the SCADA network, it introduces minimal delay
without any interference to the normal communications between the master and slave.
Let t3 be the time at which a command (CMD2) is used to slave and t4 is time when the
response (RES2) is received without data logger. Let td be the time delay added by the
SCADA data logger. As a result the master receives the message after a delay of td. Even
adding the data logger does not affect the communication between the master and slave
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because it adds minimal delay of 40 ms and hence the response reaches the master in time
before the next command issued.

Master
t1
t2
t3
t4
t4+td

Slave

CMD1
RES1
CMD2
RES2
RES2

Figure 4.1

The Effect of SCADA Data Logger in terms of Latency

Even though the SCADA data logger is active with the control system, it does not
modify any data in the messages corresponding to the control system transactions and
delivers complete transaction to the SCADA components (MTU, RTU). It just logs the
transactions and stores to the memory. The bump in wire configuration of the SCADA
data logger and normal configuration of SCADA system is shown in the figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2
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Difference Between Normal Communications and Communications with
Data Logger
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The above figure shows two configurations: one the normal communications
between the master and slave and other is with data logger in bump-in-wire
configuration. Both the configurations are tested in the SCADA security lab at
Mississippi state university and proper functioning of the control system is observed in
both cases. Let The m1 is the message transactions between the master and slave without
data logger to log the transactions. M2 is the message from master to data logger in
bump-in-wire configuration. Td is the time delay added by the data logger to
communications. In the normal configuration case, as there is no device to obstruct the
communication the control system functions normally and has no delay. In bump-in wire
configuration, the data logger is positioned between the master and slave. First the data is
received from the master (m2) and logs the data, later forwards it to slave (m2).Still in
this configuration, the message (m2) is not modified by the data logger sent from the
master. It just adds a time delay (ts in milliseconds) and delivers completely to slave. The
SCADA data logger is harmless and does not affect the normal functioning of the control
system.
The sixth requirement of the SCADA data logger is data acquisition. The data
logger acquires two types of data. First, the data logger uses serial UART(s) to collect
RS-232/RS-485 traffic between control system master nodes and the RTU or IED.
Second, the data logger samples and stores field device data by directly monitoring field
device signals. Third, the data logger can generate MODBUS read transactions to poll
information from the RTU/IED for storage. RS-232/RS-485 is a common physical layer
connection between master nodes and downstream. However, other physical layer types
are also in use. For example, many systems are beginning to use Ethernet as a physical
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layer connection. Our current data logger design supports RS-232 and RS-485physical
layer connections.
Seventh requirement of the SCADA data logger is to log data. Logging is the act
of preparing acquired data by adding security features before storing. The logging act
have three sub requirements such as data integrity, data confidentiality and time
stamping. First sub requirement of the logging is time stamping. When the data is
acquired and time stamped which helps to support the temporal analysis in both the active
and offline analysis. Second sub requirement of the data logger is to guarantee the
integrity of data. Generally Hashing functions are used to provide the data integrity. The
SCADA data logger used HMAC-SHA1 to ensure the data integrity for the logged data
and support post forensics analysis. Figure 4.3.a shows the flow diagram of the steps
followed in the data logging process while storing the network transactions and figure
4.3.b shows the process involved while retrieving the data for the post forensic analysis.
When the original message(Tm) is received, the message is appended with timestamp
value (tTM) and nonce value (n). The concatenated message is hashed with the HMACSHA-1 and the output MAC value is appended to it. During the offline analysis, the data
is retrieved from the stored transactions and value of the MAC is recalculated and
compared with stored MAC. If both the MAC values are equal, then the data is not
modified in the storage media and it ensures the data is protected safely. In case, if the
MAC value recalculated and compared with stored MAC value and are not equal, then it
indicates some data on the storage media has been modified. So in this way it is easy to
protect the data on the storage media and enhance the security feature of the SCADA data
logger.
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Figure 4.3

Flowchart For Data Storage and Data Retrieval

The last sub requirement of the logging is data confidentiality. Encryption of the
message guarantees the confidentiality of the message and the SCADA data logger uses
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) operating in Counter mode with 128 bit key.
The concatenated result of original message (ܶெ ), time stamp value (்ݐಾ ), nonce and
the MAC from output of the HMACSHA1 algorithm is encrypted using AES_CTR_128.
Thus three sub requirements of the logging ensure the message with proper time
stamping, and provides data integrity and confidentiality.
ܶ ൌ ݁మ ሺሼܶெ ǡ ்ݐಾ ǡ ܪభ ൫൛ܶெ ǡ ்ݐಾ ǡ ݊ൟ൯ǡ ݊ሽ)

1

Equation 1 shows a logged transaction (ܶ ) after preparation for storage. The
original MODBUS transaction (ܶெ ) is appended with a time stamp (்ݐಾ ) and a random
nonce (n). The concatenated result is hashed with an HMAC [6] function (computing
with an underlying SHA-1 function) using key (݇ଵ ). Next, the captured MODBUS
transaction (ܶெ ) is concatenated with the hash result and the nonce. The concatenated
result is encrypted using AES-CTR and result is stored on the hard disk drive. Where ݇ଶ
is the encryption key. The HMAC, the nonce are added to ensure data integrity. The time
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stamp appended to the logged transaction is added to support temporal analysis in both
active and offline analysis. The system master should periodically synchronize the real
time clock in the data logger with real time clocks in other nodes in the control system to
support correlation of data logger results from different points in the system. The
frequency of time synchronization depends upon the drift of the various clocks in the
system. The AES-CTR-128 achieves the data confidentiality to the logged information by
the data logger. Thus logging and its sub requirements are important in preparing
acquired data for storage and enhance the security features of the data logger.
The Eighth requirement of SCADA data logger is to storage data. Storage as the
act of storing acquired data and its accompanying log information for later retrieval. This
storage is dependent on the performance, reliability and size of the storage media used.
Current technologies offer two alternatives for the file storage: hard disk drives and. flash
memory. Hard disk drives are a complicated dynamic system that consists of the
electronic, electrical and mechanical components [29]. Hard drives provide large capacity
at low cost and through put is high for large files. The main disadvantages of the hard
disk drives are high energy consumption, high read latency. Flash memory is the non
volatile integrated circuit which can hold the data and is electrically erasable [30]. Flash
memory has advantages such as low latency, low energy consumption, high throughput
for read access, light weight, portable etc. Thus flash-based storage devices have
tremendous potential to replace the hard disk drives. The SCADA data logger works on
both platforms virtual machine and embedded platforms. In the case of the embedded
platform, the data logger uses the compact flash card available on the FPGA and the
virtual machine platform data logger uses the hard drive disk to store the transactions.

55

The SCADA data logger works for all the SCADA communication protocols
(MODBUS ASCII, MODBUS RTU and DNP3). Equation 1 shows the logged transaction
(ܶ ) which includes original transaction plus 72 byte of log information. The timestamp
is 8 bytes which provides room to support timestamps of 585K years, when stored with
microsecond precision. The HMAC-SHA1produces a MAC value of 32 bytes and nonce
of 32 bytes used which matches the key length. The size of the logged transaction and
number of the transactions logged is dependent on the type of the protocol used. In
general in the case of electrical substations, the SCADA master polls the devices
connected to it for every 2 to 4 seconds. At each 2-4 second there will be a command
from the master top slave requesting the data and a response providing data from slave to
master. Let us see the various protocol logged transactions size and number of
transactions logged per a fixed memory size. The possible transactions are MODBUS
ASCII, MODBUS RTU and DNP3. First, in the case of MODBUS ASCII mode the
maximum size of the transaction is 513 bytes and combining them with the log data the
total size of the logged transaction will be 585. The data logger operating in the
MODBUS ASCII can store 1.8x106 transactions per gigabyte. For the 2 second polling
case, the data logger can store 2.8 years of MODBUS ASCII transactions per gigabyte
and for 4 second polling case the data logger can store for 5.6 years. Second, in the case
of MODBUS RTU mode, the maximum size of the transactions is 256 bytes and adding
the log data to the original transaction the total size of the transaction is 328 bytes. The
data logger operating in the MODBUS RTU can store 3.27x106 transactions per gigabyte.
In the 2 second polling case, the data logger can hold data for a period of 5.0 years and
for 4 second polling case it can hold for a period of 10 years. Final, the in the case of
DNP3 protocol supporting data logger, the maximum size of the original DNP3
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transactions is 292 bytes. The maximum size of the logged transactions is 364 bytes
which includes the 292 bytes of original transactions and 72 bytes of log information. In
this case, the data logger can log 2.95x106 transactions per gigabyte and for 2 second
polling case the data logger can hold the data for a period of 4.5 years. For 4 second
polling case, the data logger can log data for a period of 9 years.
In the case of MSU SCADA Security Laboratory, the Master polls every slave
connected to it for every one sec. First, in the case of the MODBUS ASCII, the data
logger can log network transactions for a period of 1.4 years per gigabyte. Second, the
data logger operating in MODBUS RTU Mode can log the traffic for a period of 2.5
years. Finally, the data logger operating on the DNP3 protocol can log the network
transactions for a period of 2.25 years.
For the above analysis, the compact flash card is feasible for the embedded
platform data logger and whereas the data logger running on the HMI host may monitor
the network transaction between the HMI and many downstream s. So it may require
more storage capacity to log all the network transactions. Since this version of data
logger runs on the HMI host PC, it can access the system hard disk space to store the data
and providing significantly more storage capacity. The SCADA data logger supporting
all the SCADA communications protocols satisfies the NERC CIP data logging storage
standards. The NERC CIP 005 -3requires the data logs to be maintained for 90 calendar
days [31]. In least polling scenario, the three protocols (MODBUS ASCII, MODBUS
RTU and DNP3) transactions with log information can hold data for 1.4,2.5 and 2.25
years respectively. Thus, the data logger on the embedded platform with 1 GB card and
virtual machine platform data logger which uses the hard disk space is sufficient to log
the transactions for many years.
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Ninth, Offline analysis is one the major requirement of the SCADA data logger.
Offline analysis means performing analysis on the acquired and stored data. This process
involves the extraction of original data from the stored data using various mathematical,
cryptography techniques etc. The offline analysis is important, because this analysis helps
in the post forensic analysis of incidents and to find intrusion detections. For example,
the attack documented in [ 5,17 ].In this case the offline analysis is not easy due to lack of
data logging feature and investigation took years to find the reasons for the attacks.
There are different ways the data can be accessed from the storage for offline analysis
such as master terminal unit to poll the data logger and access the data to perform the
offline analysis or directly access the data from the storage media (Flash Card and hard
drives).
The SCADA data logger uses the following ways to access the stored data and
perform the offline analysis. First the offline analysis on the embedded systems can be
done in two methods: one method is to allow the control system master to poll the data
logger and receive the information stored on the card. Retrieving stored transaction data
is supported in two ways. First, the data logger supports using a dedicated serial port to
all access to the stored transaction data. Second, the data logger supports retrieval of the
transaction data over the same serial port being monitored. To support this retrieval
process, the SCADA data logger is connected in the bump-in-wire configuration and
assigned with a unique address. The address assigning for the data logger uses the
unassigned MODBUS or DNP3 address. In both cases, the data logger monitors the
transaction and checks the address. If a transactions is addressed to data logger then that
transactions is not passed to the RTU/IED. Instead they are serviced by the data logger
directly. At present, the SCADA data logger supports some of the queries from the
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master and retrieves data from the memory based on the query. Some of the queries
supported by the SCADA data logger are Retrieve_singlepacket, Retrieve_date and
Retrieve_daterange etc. Retrive_singlepacket is a query, which is used to retrieve a single
packet based on the file name specified. Similarly, Retrieve_date and Retrive_daterange
are set of queries which retrieve the data based on the date value specified. For example,
if master address the SCADA data logger with Retrieve_date query, then the data logger
which is continuously monitoring transactions and checking the address field does not
pass the transactions to the slave. Based on the query, the data logger finds the
transaction logged on the specified date in the query and returns the retrieved transactions
back to master. Another method is removing the compact flash card directly from the
FPGA and replacing it with a new card to log next transactions. The data on the card can
be read using compact flash card readers using a personal computer and the offline
analysis is performed on the retrieved data. As the data is in the encrypted form, it should
be decrypted and verify the data using signing algorithm for data integrity. Second
offline analysis on the virtual machine platform data logger, the data is logged to the
internal hard drives on pc or external drives connected to the pc. In this case the offline
analysis can be carried out by logging in to the PC as a user and can retrieve the required
data for offline analysis. Thus, the SCADA data logger supports the offline analysis and
helps in the post forensic analysis.
The last requirement of the SCADA data logger is to support the active analysis.
At present the active analysis is not supported by the SCADA data logger, but this feature
can be added to the data logger in future. To facilitate this feature in future, the data
logger is connected in bump- in-wire configuration and is active with network. The data
logger architecture contains a microprocessor which can be utilized to actively analyze
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capture transactions. Active analysis may be used to search transactions for intrusion
signatures. This could be done by parsing transactions and comparing the transactions to
signatures of transactions previously classify as invalid or illegal behavior. Active
analysis may also be used to limit the number of packets which must be stored in the data
logger’s hard disk drive by classifying transactions which may be safely ignored and
transactions which must be stored. Classifying transactions as ignorable would require
methods similar to that used to classify transaction as illegal or invalid. Thus the SCADA
data logger supports the Active analysis
Thus, all the requirements such data acquisition, log, store, offline analysis,
harmless etc are satisfied by the SCADA data logger implemented on both the PC and
embedded platforms.
4.5

SCADA Data Logger Architecture
The SCADA data logger is designed to work on virtual machine platform and

embedded platform. It supports both MODBUS and DNP3 protocols. The data logger can
be operated in two modes: Store-forward mode and fast forward-store mode. The
implementation details and the architecture of SCADA data logger on both platforms:
virtual machine platform and embedded platform is described in the following sections.
4.5.1

Embedded Platform
The architectural overview of the SCADA data logger on embedded platform is

shown in the block diagram 4.4. The data logger is implemented using a Virtex 5
XUPV5-LX110T [32] field programmable gate array (FPGA) integrated circuit (IC) and
1 GB memory card. The FPGA is programmed with the Xilinx EDK [33] and C language
is used for the development of software.
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Embedded Platform SCADA Data logger

The FPGA contains processor (CPU), UARTs, Timer and Compact flash card (CF
Card). Micro blaze is the soft core processor used as CPU in the implementation. It is a
reduced instruction set computer (RISC) optimized for implementation on Xilinx FPGAs
[34]. The micro blaze manages the process of logging captured transactions and can be
used for the real time analysis and offline analysis of the logged transactions. The FPGA
contains three serial UART circuits. Two of the serial UARTs` are used to monitor serial
port traffic to and from the RTU/IED. The third serial UART is reserved to allow master
nodes a direct connection to the data logger to retrieve stored transaction information.
Timer on the FPGA is used to timestamp the network transactions when they are acquired
from the UARTs. The timer on the FPGA always synchronizes with time clock on the
master end. The transactions between the SCADA components are logged to 1 GB
compact flash card available on the board. The transactions are stored to text files on the
cards and a track of newly created files is maintained in a main log file. As future work,
external memories like hard drives can be connected to the FPGA to increase the memory
space for storage.
Figure 4.4 shows the SCADA data logger straddling a within a control system.
The master node in Figure communicates with downstream nodes via radio. Use of radios
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to for point to point and point to multipoint communications is common in control
systems since the radio save on wiring expense and allowed for communication over long
distances. In control system shown the master node uses a RS-232 physical link to
communicate with the RTU/IED. The radio connection carries the RS-232 traffic and
delivers it to the RTU/IED. On the right hand side of the RTU/IED a sensor and a switch
are shown. RTU commonly use integrated microcontrollers to monitor and control field
devices such as sensors, switches, valves, and actuators.
The embedded platform version of the data logger is implemented using an FPGA
is compact and portable. This version of the data logger can be deployed in remote sites
easily, left untouched for years and it logs the network transactions efficiently.
4.5.2

Virtual Machine Platform
The virtual machine data logger is implemented as Linux process running in a

virtual machine on a personal computer (PC) which hosts the HMI. This version of data
logger uses the hard drive space on the host’s PC hard disk to store the transactions.
DNP3 and MODBUS protocols are supported by this data logger. The time stamping is
based on the local system timing of the PC. The virtual machine data logger can be in
upstream of the SCADA network to log the network transactions and provide the
transactions related to response injection and denial of service attacks on MTU. The
virtual machine platform data logger uses a single physical RS232 (UART) port to
connect to the MTU and a virtual serial port to connect the HMI to the virtual machine
running the data logger process. In this version, the CPU processes bytes received from
the one UART and forwards to another UART. Generally, this way of implementation
has higher processing speed and large memory to store the data. The architectural
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overview of the SCADA data logger on the virtual machine platform is shown in the
figure 4.5.
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Virtual Machine Platform SCADA Data Logger

Figure 4.5 shows the data logger running as a Linux process on the HMI host PC.
The physical port used to connect the data logger to the MTU and a virtual port to
connect it to the HMI. The data logger operating on the HMI host PC logs the network
transactions such as commands form the HMI to the and responses from the to the HMI.
This version of data logger incurs less software implementation costs and the logged data
is less prone to the attacks. The software implementation of this version data logger
incurs less cost, because this version can be run as Linux process on the existing HMI
host PC without any additional hardware As the HMI is protected safely with limited
access to authorized persons, it is not easy for an attacker to access the logged data.
The virtual machine data logger can be placed in possible three locations in the
upstream side to log the network transactions. First, the virtual machine data logger can
be run as a Linux process on the PC hosting the HMI. This position of data logger can log
network transactions related to commands from the HMI to the downstream elements and
responses from the downstream elements to HMI. If an attacker gains access over the
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physical connections between the HMI and MTU and between the MTU and radio,
he/she can still manipulate the responses from the downstream elements and commands
from the HMI. Second, the virtual machine data logger version can be run as Linux
process on another PC and can be placed in bump-in-wire configuration between the
HMI host and MTU. In this case, still the data logger can log the all the network
transactions efficiently. One possible chance for an attacker is to bypass the connection
between the MTU and Radio and introduce any kind of attacks. Third, the virtual
machine platform data logger can be run as Linux process on another PC and connected
between the MTU and radio. This placement can also log the network transactions
efficiently. The possible chances for an attacker are to gain access over the HMI PC or by
pass the physical connection between the MTU and HMI host. Gaining access over the
HMI, an attacker can issue the wrong commands to downstream elements and cause the
malfunctioning of the control system. Hence, independent of the data logger placement in
the SCADA network, the virtual machine platform SCADA data logger and embedded
machine platform data logger logs the complete network transactions efficiently and
logged data supports the post forensic analysis. Thus, the SCADA data logger supports
two platforms: virtual machine and embedded platforms, supports the DNP3 and
MODBUS Protocols.
4.6

SCADA Data Logger Operation Modes
The SCADA data logger can be operated in two modes: Store and Forward and

Fast Forward and store. The flow charts of each mode are shown in the figure 4.6.
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Flowcharts of Fast forward-store and store-forward modes

First the store-forward mode, in this mode, the Get function receives byte by byte
from the port and produces a complete pdu (TM).The transaction is time stamped while it
is acquired from the UART. Once the pdu is received, it is concatenated with timestamp
and nonce. Next the HMAC operation is performed on the concatenated value of the
original transaction (PDU), timestamp and nonce and produces a tag value (MAC). Once
the tag is obtained, it is combined with original transaction, timestamp and the result is
encrypted with the Aes_Ctr. The output from the encryption function is stored on the
compact flash card with the help of store function. After the process of storing the
transaction to the card, the Send function sends the pdu through another port. The pdu
retained in the data logger, while the operations of HMAC, Aes_Ctr and storage carried
out. As a result, the latency increases and dependent on the length of message, time taken
for cryptographic functions HMACSHA1 and AES_CTR and time taken to write the data
to memory. This mode adds more latency to overall system and affects the normal
function of the control system.
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while (1){
get(port 1)
hmac_sha1
aes_ctr
store
send(port 2)
}
Figure 4.7

Pseudo Code For Store and Forward Mode

Second the fast forward-store mode, in this mode, the Get_send function receives
byte by byte from one port and simultaneously forwards the data to another port. The
Get_send function is used to transmit and receive the data but also return the complete
pdu after every transaction. Once the complete pdu is received, similar operations to store
and forward mode such as concatenating the pdu with timestamp, nonce, performing the
HMAC, Aes_Ctr, storing transactions to the compact flash is performed. The calculation
of HMAC, Aes_Ctr and storing operations does not affect the operation of the control
system and adds very less delay compared to store and forward mode.

while (1){
get_send(port1,port2)
hmac_sha1
aes_ctr
store
}
Figure 4.8

Pseudo Code For Fast forward-Store Mode
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Thus the SCADA data logger can be operated in two modes. When compared in
terms of latency, the fast forward and store is efficient method compared to store and
forward mode. Because the fast forward mode adds less latency compared to store and
forward mode and does not affect the normal function of the control systems.
4.7

Software Implementation of SCADA Data Logger
The SCADA data logger is implemented on virtual machine and embedded

platforms, supports both SCADA communication protocols (MODBUS and DNP3). The
software implementation of the SCADA data logger on virtual machine platform is
implemented using a PC running Linux on Virtual machine environment, and the data
logging process is implemented to run as a Linux process. The data logger in the virtual
machine platform uses the internal hard disk connected to the PC to store the network
transactions. Whereas the software implementation of the SCADA data logger on
embedded platform is implemented using Embedded Development Kit (EDK) and
Virtex- 5(XUPV5-LX110T) FPGA board. For details about the software development
platform and syntaxes of the functions used in the implementation of the SCADA data
logger on embedded platform refer to appendix B.
The software implementation of SCADA data logger on PC and embedded
platform consists of two layers: application layer and hard ware abstraction layer. The
Application layer is common for the both the platforms, whereas the hardware abstraction
layer differs between the two platforms. The hard ware abstraction layer deals with the
initialization of serial UARTS on the two platforms. On virtual machine platform, the
UART is initialized using open ( ) function and runs at a baud rate of 9600.The functions
read ( ) and write ( ) are used to receive and transmit data through the UARTs. On the
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embedded platform, the UART are initialized using the XUartNs550_Initialize, and
operated at a baud rate of 9600. The XUartNs550_Recv and XUartNs550_Send

are

used to receive and transmit data through the UARTs. Table 4.2 lists various hardware
abstraction layer and application layer functions used in the software development of the
SCADA data logger.
The application layer consists of many functions to support both SCADA
protocols (MODBUS and DNP3).The basic functions which are used in all other
functions are Get_Byte and Send_Byte. The Get_byte uses read ( ) function on PC
platform and XUartNs550_Recv on the embedded platform. This function receives data
in order of byte size. The return value of Get_Byte is length of data receives. The other
basic function is Send_Byte, which uses write ( ) function on PC platform and
XUartNs550_Send on the embedded platform. This function is used to transmit the data
through UART and the return is length of data transmitted.
Depending on the protocol supported by the data logger, various functions are
defined in the application layer. First, the functions used by the data logger, when
operating in the MODBUS ASCII MODE are Get_Modbus_Ascii, Send_Modbus_Ascii
and Get_send_Modbus_Ascii. The Get_Modbus_Ascii function is used to receive the
complete Modbus ASCII transactions from the network. This function calls the Get_byte
function in a loop until the complete transactions is received. The return value of this
function is MODBUS ASCII transaction.
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Table 4.2
No

Various Data Logger Functions and Syntaxes
Functions

1

XUartNs550_Initialize

2

XUartNs550_Recv

3

XUartNs550_Send

4

Get_byte

5

Send_Byte

6

Get_Modbus_Ascii

7

Get_send_Modbus_Ascii

8

Send_Modbus_Ascii

9

Get_Modbus_RTU

10

Send_Modbus_RTU

11

Sendlpdu

12

Getlpdu

Syntax
int
XUartNs550_Initialize( XUartNs550*
InstancePtr, u16 DeviceId)
unsigned int XUartNs550_Recv (
XUartNs550 *
InstancePtr, u8 *
BufferPtr, unsigned int
NumBytes
)
unsigned int XUartNs550_Send (
XUartNs550 *
InstancePtr, u8 *
BufferPtr, unsigned int
NumBytes
)
int Get_Byte(int inport, char
*byte)
int Send_Byte(int outport, char
byte)
struct modbus_pdu
*Get_Modbus_Ascii(int inport);
Struct modbus_pdu *
Get_Send_Modbus_Ascii(int inport,
int outport)
void Send_Modbus_Ascii(int
outport, struct modbus_pdu *pdu);
struct modbus_pdu
*Get_Modbus_RTU(int inport)
Void Send_Modbus_RTU(int outport,
struct modbus_pdu *pdu)
void Sendlpdu(int outport, struct
DNP3_lpdu *lpdu);
int Getlpdu(int inport, struct
DNP3_lpdu *lpdu);

The Send_Modbus_Ascii is used to transmit the MODBUS ASCII transaction in
to the network. This function calls the Send_Byte in a loop until the complete transaction
is transmitted through UART and return value in NULL. The Get_Send_Modbus_Ascii
function uses the both Get_Byte and Send_Byte functions to receive and transmit the
transaction. Second, the data logger operating in MODBUS RTU mode uses the
Get_Modbus_RTU and Send_Modbus_RTU. The Get_Modbus_RTU is used to receive
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data and the underlying function is Get_Byte and Send_Modbus_RTU uses Send_Byte
for transmitting the data.
Similarly the DNP3 based data logger uses Sendlpdu and Getlpdu for transmitting
and receiving operations. Thus, the software implementation of SCADA data logger on
the virtual machine and embedded platform are explained.
4.8

Key Storage Mechanisms
The SCADA data logger uses cryptographic algorithms such AES with counter

mode and HMAC SHA1.Both the algorithms involves secret keys, which should be
protected safely. The design of SCADA data logger mainly aims at logging and uses the
data for post forensic analysis. This work did not attempt to solve the key storage
problem, but at present the keys are embedded in the software code running on the PC
and embedded platforms. An attempt is made to find the various available methods for
storing the keys safely and securely.
Storing keys is vital processes in any cryptographic applications. The safety and
security of key storage have a major influence in the designing of cryptographic
applications. Because various security services such as authentication, authorization,
confidentiality and non-repudiation are dependent on cryptography and its applications.
The SCADA data logger is implemented on virtual machine and embedded platforms.
Several methods are available to protect the keys on both the platforms. When compared
to embedded platform to the PC platform, the latter has higher processing power and
mechanism to handle different processes at single time. In the case of PC based data
logger, efficient key generation mechanisms can be used to generate the keys on the fly
and can protect them safely in the secure databases. Due to limited resources on the
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embedded platform, the options are limited. Some of the key storage mechanisms for the
embedded platforms are listed below. First method is to embed the long keys used for
various cryptography techniques in the software code running on the FPGA [35].As the
bit stream on the hardware is securely protected and prevents the stealing of keys by an
attacker. Various bit stream protection schemes are available in market. For example,
Xilinx based FPGA supports AES encryption of bit stream to accomplish security [36].
The key bits are stored in the nonvolatile memory and long life batteries are used to keep
the memory active. The problem associated with this method is the secret key is fixed for
long time.
Second method is to store keys of cryptography techniques directly in the
nonvolatile memory available on the FPGA and supported with long life batteries [37].
The method is dependent on the life time of batteries used, failures of batteries etc. The
keys can be accessed from the nonvolatile memory during run time. Third method is
hardware implemented key storage, which allows the secure storage and high
performance retrieval of the keys [38].In this method, a device is implemented on the top
of a commercial off the shell (COTS) programmable hardware board (Celoxia RC1000)
which is mounted on a Xilinx virtex E 2000 FPGA. This system contains two parts:
controller and the store. The main function of the controller is to control the transfer
operation of keys from board memory to FPGA memory. The board memory is used as
buffer for holding the keys during the transferring. The store block is used for storing the
keys safely and securely. This method helps to prevent the attacks at user level, root level
and physical level. Thus any of above key storage mechanisms can be used for secure
protection of the keys and can be integrated with the SCADA data logger more secure.
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4.9

Summary
Thus this chapter includes the motivation for the design of the data logger, related

works, explains the architecture of the SCADA data logger on the virtual machine and
embedded platforms. The requirements of the data logger are listed, software
implementation of the architecture on the embedded and virtual machine platforms, and
operation modes of the SCADA data logger details and finally details about various
available key storage mechanisms are explained in this chapter.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
5.1

Introduction
In this chapter the details about SCADA data logger validation and verification at

MSU SCADA security Laboratory and in the Virtual machine desktop environment
(Simulation environment) are explained. The latency measurements in different
configurations and comparison studies between the various configurations, different
modes of SCADA data logger and list of achieved SCADA data logger requirements are
included in this chapter.
5.2

SCADA Data Logger Validation and Verification
The validation and verification of the SCADA data logger is done in several

methods. The data logger supports two protocols MODBUS and DNP3 and works on
both virtual machine and embedded platforms. The working of the data logger on both
virtual machine platform and embedded platform is validated and verified using different
setups.
First, the implementation and verification of SCADA data logger is done at MSU
SCADA security Laboratory. The SCADA laboratory is equipped with two masters and
five slave devices. The slave models that are configured in laboratory are a gas pipeline
operation, an industrial blower (such as found in mining applications), a conveyor belt
operation, a municipal water tower, and an oil/gas storage facility. This laboratory also
contains two fully equipped HMI control stations currently running GE Proficy iFIX version
73

(4.5). The control stations receive both the wired and wireless signals. All stations in lab

use non-traditional protocols and transmission medium (e.g., 900 MHz radios and RS232 links between master stations and slave PLC’s). SCADAPacks hardware with an
option for setting protocols as either MODBUS or DNP3 – two common control system
protocols used in the US. For description about each component in the laboratory refer to
Section 2.6.
Second verification and validation of the SCADA data logger is tested on VM
ware desktop environment (Simulation Environment) where windows is the host
operating system(Processor: AMD Turion @ 2 GHZ,3GB ram,250GB Hard disk space)
and Linux runs as the guest operating system(Processor: AMD Turion @ 2 GHZ,3GB
ram,8GB Hard disk space). On the guest operating system, both the master and slave
terminals are initiated on the pc and working of SCADA data logger is validated. In this
validation setup, the dummy packets resembling actual network traffic taken from MSU
SCADA Security Laboratory are used to validate the working of the data logger. Thus
the two testing environment for the validation and verification of the data logger are
explained.
Table 5.1 shows the validation and verification of SCADA data logger using
above mentioned environments. The SCADA data logger implemented on PC and
embedded platforms supporting both MODBUS and DNP3 protocols is validated using
the VMware Desktop environment. The MSU SCADA Security Laboratory is used to
validate the SCADA data logger implemented on both virtual machine and embedded
platform.
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Table 5.1

Details About Validation of SCADA Data Logger on Different
Environments
Modbus

DNP3

Modbus ASCII
Modbus RTU
Validation Embedded
PC
Embedded
PC
Environment platform
platform platform
platform
Simulation
Environment
MSU
SCADA
security
Laboratory

Embedded
platform

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

-

9

-

PC
platform
9
-

Table 5.2 shows the validation and verification of the SCADA data logger in the
MSU SCADA Security Laboratory. The virtual machine platform SCADA data logger
operating in the two modes of the MODBUS i.e. MODBUS ASCII and MODBUS RTU
works on all the 5 slaves and is able to log the transactions successfully.
Whereas the data logger implemented on the embedded platform supporting
MODBUS ASCII is validated in the MSU SCADA Security Lab, but the implementation
of RTU mode supporting embedded based platform data logger is not implemented and
verified, due to limited resources such as implementation of timers and synchronizing
them with each other etc.
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Table 5.2

Details about Validation of SCADA data logger in MSU SCADA Security
Laboratory

Control station

Modbus
Modbus ASCII
Modbus RTU
Embedded
PC
PC
Embedded
platform
platfor
platform platform
m

Gas pipeline

9

9

-

9

Conveyor belt

9

9

-

9

Industrial
blower
Municipal
watertank
Oil/gas storage

9

9

-

9

9

9

-

9

9

9

-

9

Thus, the working of SCADA data logger based on MODBUS and DNP3
protocols are verified and validated using MSU SCADA Security Laboratory and
VMware desktop Environment (Simulation Environment).
5.3

Testing Environment Configurations
The SCADA data logger is designed to log the communications between the

master and slave. The data logger works on virtual machine and embedded platforms. It
is compatible with the two SCADA protocols and MODBUS and DNP3.The data logger
works in two modes: First one, Store and forward, in which the data logger receives the
complete pdu from one end (Master) and performs the cryptographic operations on data,
stores and then forwards it on another end (Slave). Second one fast forward and store, in
this mode the pdu is not retained in data logger as long as the operations of cryptography
and store process are performed. To study the impact of the SCADA data logger on the
normal functioning of the control system, the latency of round trip communication is
measured with and without data logger in two modes.
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The test environment used for the measuring the latency of round trip
communication consists of the following equipment: Test PC running the VMware,
where the host operating system is windows and Linux is the guest operating system,
NULL modem cables for connecting the Laptop and the test module. The virtual machine
platform SCADA logger and embedded based data logger is the test modules connected
to the PC for measuring the latency in different configurations such as loop back, PC
connected to embedded platform data logger ad PC connected to pc based data logger.
The total environment communications are operated at baud rate of 9600.
During testing three configurations are used in the measurement of the latency for
the data logger. The three configurations used for the measurement of the roundtrip
latency are Loopback configuration, PC to embedded platform data logger and PC to
virtual machine platform data logger.
First, Loop back configuration is a basic configuration which resembles normal
communication line between the master and slave in SCADA system. This configuration
consists of test pc with VM ware and null modem. The SCADA data logger is not
connected to test pc in this configuration. The configuration measurement provides a
baseline for the comparison purposes. The loopback configuration is shown in the figure
5.1.

Test PC
U1
U2

Figure 5.1

Loopback Configuration
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Second configuration used is Test PC to embedded platform SCADA data logger.
This configuration consists of PC running VM ware, null modem and the embedded
platform data logger. The test PC and the data logger are connected with null modem
cables. In Test PC to embedded platform SCADA data logger configuration, the data
logger is operated in fast forward-store mode and store-forward mode for latency
measurements. The PC to embedded platform SCADA data logger configuration is
shown in the figure 5.2.

Test PC
U1
U2
Figure 5.2

Embedded Platform
Data logger

U1
U2

Test PC to Embedded Platform Data logger

The last configuration is Test PC to virtual machine platform data logger. This
configuration consists of test PC running VM ware, null modem cables and virtual
machine platform data logger. The test PC and the data logger are connected with null
modem cables. In this configuration, the data logger is operated in fast forward-store
mode and store-forward mode for latency measurements. The Test PC to virtual machine
data logger configuration is shown in the figure 5.3
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Virtual machine
Data logger(PC)

Test PC

Figure 5.3

U1

U1

U2

U2

Test PC to Virtual Machine Platform Data Logger

In all the configurations, the PDUs are sent from one UART (U1) on the test PC
and looped back to receive on the another UART (U2).Thus, the above configurations are
used to measure the roundtrip latency and the obtained values is used to study the impact
of the SCADA data logger on the control system functioning.
5.4

Measurement of Roundtrip latency
The latency is the time taken for a packet to reach destination from source and

roundtrip latency includes both the time from source to destination and vice versa . The
difference between those times gives the total round trip time. For example, let the t1 be
the time at which a packet leaves the source and t2 be the time at which the packet is
receives at source end from the destination. The difference between the t1 and t2 gives
the total roundtrip latency i.e round trip latency = t2-t1.
The impact of the SCADA data logger on the control system is measured using
the roundtrip time. To calculate the roundtrip latency, the local system time on the test
PC with VM ware is used to time measurements. The time measurement starts when the
first byte of the PDU was sent to the UART (U1) on the test PC and stopped when the
first byte id received on the another UART(U2). For example, In the case of MODBUS
ASCII, we have start identifier (colon) to indicate the start of the message and stop values
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(CR, LF) to find the end of the message. Thus, we time measurement starts when the
colon is sent to UART (U1) and the moment when colon is received on another UART
(U2) the time measurement is stopped. The difference between start and stop values gives
the roundtrip latency values. To analyze the impact of the SCADA data logger on the
control system in terms of round trip latency, three test cases are used. The first two test
cases use the VM ware Desktop environment (Simulation Environment) and last test case
measurements are taken in the MSU SCADA security laboratory. The three test cases
used and results obtained are explained in the following sections.
5.4.1

Test Case I
In the first test case, a set of 500 PDUs of different varying length is used. Each

PDU is sent to UART (U1) on the test PC and time stamped when the first byte of the
PDU is transmitted. When the first byte of the PDU is received back on another UART
(U2), the data is also time stamped. The difference between the two timestamp values
gives the roundtrip latency value. This method is used to make comparison between the
different configurations such as loopback, Test PC to embedded platform data logger
operating in fast forward –store and store-forward modes, Test PC to virtual machine
platform data logger operating in fast forward–store and store-forward modes based on
the roundtrip latency values. The results of the Test case 1 in different configurations are
shown in the table 5.3
Table 5.3 shows the round trip latency values obtained for different configurations
using the Test PC and following conclusions are made based on the data. First, the loop
back configuration average 35ms and is the lowest of all the configurations, because in
this configuration the data logger is not connected. So this configuration resembles the
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normal communication model between the MTU and with no delay. Thus, it is used as
the baseline for the comparison study. Second, the comparison between the two platforms
i.e. embedded platform data logger and virtual machine platform data logger operated in
both the modes is studied.
The virtual machine platform data logger adds less delay compared to the
embedded platform data loggers, because the virtual machine platform data loggers runs
on a high processing HMI PC. The HMI PC has high processing power and resources
compared to the embedded platform resources. Thus, the virtual machine platform data
logger is efficient and adds less delay compared to the embedded version data logger.
The last comparison is made between the two modes of the SCADA data logger
i.e. fast forward-store and store-forward mode on the virtual machine platform and
embedded machine platform. The fast forward-store mode is faster compared to the storeforward mode and adds less delay to the control system. Because, in the store-forward
mode, the PDU is retains in the data logger, until the operations of signing, encrypting
and storing the data is done. Whereas, in the fast forward-store, the data logger processes
the data bytes as received from one UART (U1) and forwards them to another UART
(U2). When complete PDU is captured, the operation of signing, encrypting and storing
the data is performed and these operations do not affect the normal functioning of the
control system.
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Table 5.3

Results of Test Case I on Three Configurations
Average
Roundtrip Latency
(ms)

Configuration
(Mode)
Loop back

35.07

Test PC to embedded platform data logger
(Fast Forward –store mode)

40.70

Test PC to embedded platform data logger
(Store - forward Mode)

443.67

Test PC to virtual machine platform data logger
(Fast Forward - store Mode)

39.86

Test PC to virtual machine platform data logger
(Store - forward Mode)

420.89

So the data logger operating in the fast forward mode is faster than the storeforward mode. Thus, from the test case 1 makes a comparison study of roundtrip latency
values between the different platforms and different modes of the data loggers. The Test
case I results concludes that the fast forward-store mode faster than the store-forward
mode and virtual machine platform data logger adds less delay compared to the
embedded platform data logger.
5.4.2

Test Case II
The Second test case is used to study the effect of message length on the roundtrip

latency in different configurations. For this test case, a set of 100 packets of varying
lengths(10,30,50,100,150,200,230,250) are used. Table5.4 shows the roundtrip latency
value in all the three configurations loopback, PC to embedded platform data logger and
PC to PC based data logger in which the data logger can be operated in fast forward-store
and store –forward mode.
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Table 5.4 shows the roundtrip latency values on the different configuration with
varying the length of the PDU. The length of PDU is varied from the 10 to 250. Based on
the data obtained in the test case II, the following conclusions are made. First, the round
trip latency values in the fast forward mode virtually remains constant and does not vary
much with the increase in the length. Because in the fast forward-store mode, the data
logger processes the bytes received from the UART (U1) and transmits to another UART
(U2). As the time measurements in the test cases is taken when the first byte of the PDU
is transmitted and received on the UARTs. So, the round trip latency time virtually
remains constant.
Second, the round trip latency values in the store –forward mode is dependent on
the length of the PDU and increases with increase in the length. In the store-forward
mode, the PDU received from the UART (U1) by the data logger is not forwarded to
another UART (U2) immediately. Once the complete PDU is captured, the operations
such as time stamping, signing encrypting of data and storing are performed. After
storing, the PDU is forwarded to another UART (U2).So as the length of the PDU
increases, the time taken to do all the above operations also increases and results in
increase in the roundtrip latency.
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Table 5.4

Results Showing the Impact of PDU length on the Round trip Latency Time
Configuration
Test PC to Embedded
platform data logger

Lengt
h
Loopback
10
30
50
100
150
200
230
250

30.85
30.08
33.37
33.11
31.81
31.84
32.49
30.06

Fast
forwardstore
42.63
40.13
44.55
40.13
48.06
45.87
44.23
43.56

Storeforward
mode
358
408
645
980
1095
1136
1314
1450

Test PC to virtual
machine platform data
logger
Fast
Storeforwardforward
store
mode
33.67
325
35.98
389
36.09
590
35.77
914
37.23
937
35.23
968
36.45
1197
38.93
1366

Thus, the data logger operating in the store-forward mode is dependent on the
length of the PDU and the roundtrip time increases with increase in the length.
5.4.3

Test Case III
The configuration setup used in the test case III is shown in the figure 5.4. The

measurement results in this test case are taken in the MSU SCADA Security Laboratory
to study the impact of the data logger on the model control system which resembles
actual industrial setup. In this configuration, MTU, the test pc, data logger and slave RTU
(gas pipeline control system and municipal water tower control system) is used to
measure the roundtrip latency values. The dotted indicates the flow of the pdu sent from
the MTU to test PC, test PC to RTU, response from RTU to test PC and from the test PC
to MTU. First, the configuration is tested without any data logger to log the network
transactions. This configuration includes the only MTU, Test PC and RTU. The test PC
receives the commands from the MTU, timestamps when the first byte of the PDU is
received and forwards the PDU to the RTU. Similarly the test PC receives the response
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from the RTU; timestamps when the first byte of the PDU is receives and forwards PDU
to MTU. The difference between those two timestamps gives the roundtrip latency used
as baseline for comparison studies.
Second, the data logger is included in the configuration and is connected between
the test PC and RTU. The data logger is operated in the two modes of MODBUS i.e.
MODBUS ASCII and MODBUS RTU.

MTU
U1
U2

Figure 5.4

SCADA
Data logger

Test PC
U1
U2

U1
U2

RTU

U1

U2

U1

U1

U2

U2

Test case Configuration for latency measurements in MSU SCADA
Security Laboratory

At present, the DNP3 based data logger is not validated in the MSU SCADA
Security Laboratory due to unavailability of DNP3 supporting master. When the SCADA
data logger is working in MODBUS ASCII mode, the MTU and gas pipeline control
system (RTU) are configured to MODBUS ASCII mode. Similar when the SCADA data
logger is working in MODBUS ASCII Mode, the MTU and gas/oil storage control
system (RTU) are configured in MODBUS RTU mode. In both modes, the MTU polls
the slave connected to it for every 1 second.
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Table 5.5

Results showing the impact of SCADA data logger tested in MSU SCADA
Security Laboratory.

N
O
1
2.
3.

Configuration
Basic configuration(No Data logger)
Configuration with Data logger operating in
MODBUS ASCII Mode
Configuration with Data logger operating in
MODBUS RTU Mode

Roundtrip
Latency
2.50 sec
2.80sec
2.725sec

Table 5.5 shows the results taken in the MSU SCADA Security Laboratory by
operating the data logger in both modes of the MODBUS i.e. MODBUS ASCII and
MODBUS RTU modes. The table consists of average roundtrip latency values taken
from the average of the 200 network transactions captured in the MSU SCADA Security
Laboratory. The normal operation of the entire control system in the MSU SCADA
Security Laboratory is not affected with the addition of the SCADA data logger, but it
just adds minimal delay in the transmission of the transactions. Thus, the SCADA data
logger does not affect the normal operation of the control system and satisfies its
requirement being harmless.
5.5

Achieved SCADA Data logger Requirements
The SCADA data logger has different requirements which are introduced in

chapter 1 and explained in detail in chapter 4.Table 5.6 lists the achieved SCADA data
logger requirements. The SCADA data logger is designed to fit the legacy SCADA
control system in bump-in-wire configuration and also supports the post forensic
analysis. It is compatible to work on both platform and supports both SCADA
protocols(MODBUS and DNP3).The latency values obtained in various configuration,
validation of data logger in different environment(simulation and MSU SCADA Security
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Laboratory) proves the data logger is harmless, but adds a minimal delay in the network.
The SCADA data logger supports the offline analysis and lays foundation for active
analysis in future. The time stamping of the network transactions helps in both the offline
and active analysis. Finally, the SCADA data logger supports compact flash cards on
embedded platform and hard drives in virtual machine platforms as storage devices. Thus
the SCADA data logger meets all the requirements laid.
Table 5.6

Achieved SCADA Data Logger Requirements
SNO
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

5.6

Requirements
Bump-in-wire retrofit
Support Post forensic
analysis
Platform Compatible
Protocol compatible
Harmless
Data Acquisition
Log Data
Store Data
Offline analysis
Support Active
analysis

Achieved
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

Conclusions
Thus, this chapter includes various roundtrip latency measurements, comparison

studies between different configurations such as loopback, PC- embedded platform data
logger and PC to virtual machine data logger, lists the achieved requirements of the
SCADA Data logger. Based on the results we conclude that fast forward-store mode adds
less latency and have minimal impact on the normal function of the control system
compared to the store-forward mode. Other conclusions are the virtual machine data
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logger is faster compared to embedded platform data logger, due to high processing of
the virtual machine PC.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
SCADA systems are used to monitor and control various critical processes in
critical infrastructures such as water treatment plants, electricity generation, chemical
processing etc. Failure of these critical infrastructure leads to financial loss and physical
harm to the citizenry. Generally the SCADA network is poorly protected and makes
system more vulnerable to various attacks such as response injection attack, command
injection attack and denial of service attacks. The reasons various attack on the SCADA
systems are unknown due to lack of data logging facility. Therefore, this thesis work aim
at developing a retrofit SCADA data logger for the SCADA systems.
In this thesis, we have defined the need of data logging in the SCADA systems,
implemented SCADA data logger architecture on virtual machine and embedded
platform, listing the requirements a set of data logger requirements and explained how the
requirements are achieved by the SCADA data logger.
The final conclusions of this thesis work are the SCADA data logger is
implemented on the virtual machine platform and embedded machine platform. The data
logger implementations are compatible to work with SCADA communications protocols
such as MODBUS and DNP3.It is designed to operate in two modes: store-forward mode
and fast forward–store mode. The cryptographic techniques such as HMAC SHA1 and
AES operating in Counter mode (CTR) are used to provide the security to the logged data
and the use the logged information in the post forensic analysis.
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At present the SCADA data logger is limited to some basic functions such as
logging, time stamping and protecting the data. Many features can be added to the data
logger as future work to make it more efficient and compatible. At present, the SCADA
data logger uses on RS-232 and RS-485 has physical layer. This can be extended to
support Ethernet as future work.
The SCADA data logger developed is compatible to work on both the virtual
machine and embedded platform. Due to limited resources and problems faced with the
timers on the embedded platform, the SCADA data logger implementation on the
embedded platform supporting MODBUS RTU is not successful. And validation of the
DNP3 based data logger at MSU SCADA Security Laboratory is also not successful. So,
this work can be extended to implement the MODBUS RTU supporting SCADA data
logger and validation of DNP3 based data logger in laboratory.
In this thesis, the SCADA data logger does support the active analysis. To support
active analysis in future, the SCADA data logger is connected in bump-in-wire
configurations. But the active analysis is not implemented as a part of this work. So as a
future work, an efficient intrusion detection system (IDS) can be integrated with the data
logger to capture packets and scan for the intruders at RTU (or MTU) online. This
process helps in reducing the number of packets to be logged and helps in efficient
utilization of the available memory. Thus active analysis feature can be extended to the
SCADA Data logger.
The SCADA Data logger implemented in this thesis mainly aims at the capturing
the network transaction in the SCADA network both in the upstream and downstream,
protecting the logged information safely. To ensure safety of the logged transaction,
various cryptographic techniques such as HMACSHA1 and AES-CTR are used and the
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keys used in these algorithms are embedded in the software code running on the data
logger. As a future work, the efficient key storage mechanism, key generation methods
can be investigated and integrate them with the SCADA data logger.
The storage mechanism implemented in this thesis is simple and logs one file for
the one transaction, supports a few queries to retrieve the data back from the storage. As a
feature work, the data base for logged transactions can be developed and add features
such as querying the data base, backup the database on regular time basis etc. Efficient
methods can be investigated.
Thus the conclusions and futures work of the SCADA Data logger implemented
in this thesis.
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APPENDIX A
CRYPTOGRAPHY BACKGROUND
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Cryptography is the algorithmic method in which security goals are
accomplished. The main goals of the cryptographic are privacy, integrity, authentication
and non-repudiation. Many standards and algorithm are developed to achieve the above
goals. First goal, privacy is the property of concealing the intent of the message. In
particular, it means conceal the information from attackers while transmission of data
takes places. Second goal, Integrity is the property of ensuring correctness in the absence
of an actively participating adversary. In general, it means ensuring that a message is
delivered safely from point A to Point B without any change in content. The property of
the integrity can be obtained using one way hash functions. Third goal, authentication is
process of validating the user or computer to ensure that it is what it claims. And the last
goal of the cryptography is non–repudiation prevents either sender or receiver from
denying a transmitted message.
The SCADA data logger implements the HMAC with SHA1 as underlying
function and AES operating in counter mode (CTR) is used to secure the logged data. A
brief description about each cryptographic functions used in the designing of the SCADA
Data logger is explained.

The Advanced Encryption Standard is the NIST encryption

standard The AES is more secure, reliable and efficient. It supports 128,196 and 256 key
sizes. Generally AES can be operated in five modes: Electronic code book (ECB),
Cipher-block chaining (CBC), Cipher feedback (CFB), Output feedback (OFB), Counter
mode (CTR). First mode, electronic codebook is the simplest of all the encryption modes
and suitable for short messages. Second mode, Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) involves
XOR operations of the cipher blocks with same single key. To produce the first block of
cipher text, an initialization vector (IV) is XORed with the first block of the plain text.
The initialization vector must be known to sender and receiver. Using this mode, the
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confidentiality and authentication property are achieved. Third mode, Cipher Feed Back
Mode (CFB) is AES mode in which the input is considered as stream of bits. The major
disadvantage of this mode is the error will propagates for the several blocks after the
occurrence of error. Fourth mode, OFB operation is similar to CFB, except that the
output of the encryption function is fed back to the shift register. In this mode, the error
does not propagate in the transmission.
Last mode of the AES is the counter mode. In this mode, a counter equal to the
plaintext block size is used. Typically, the counter is initialized to some value and
incremented by 1 for each subsequent block. For encryption, the counter is encrypted and
then XORed with the plaintext blocks to produce the cipher blocks. For decryption, the
same sequence of counter is used, with each encrypted counter XORed with a cipher
block to produce the original plain text. The major advantages of the counter mode are
hardware efficiency, software efficiency; simplicity etc. The counter mode supports the
property of parallelism which helps to increase the hard ware and software efficiency.
The implementation of the AES_CTR is very simple, because it requires only
implementation of the encryption algorithm and same algorithm can be used for the
decryption also. Generally this mode is used in applications where high-speed network
encryption is required.
HMAC is the cryptographic technique for calculating the message authentication
code (MAC) involving a cryptographic hash function. Any iterative cryptographic hash
function, such as MD5 or SHA-1 etc. may be used in the calculation of the HMAC. The
strength of the HMAC depends upon the strength of the underlying cryptographic
function, size of the key and size of the hash output. Then HMAC can be expressed as
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HMAC(K,m) = H((K ْ opad)  צH((K ْ ipad)  צm)).

2

In the above equation, H represents cryptographic function in which the
underlying may be sha-1 or md5. K represents the secret key and b indicates the number
of bits in a block. Opad and Ipad are the outer and inner padding used in the calculation
of HMAC. The sha-1 function is the underlying function used in the calculation of
HMAC for the logged data in the implementation of the data logger. The secure Hash
Algorithm was developed by the National standards and Technology (NIST) and
published as a federal information processing standard. The SHA1 algorithm takes input
a message with a maximum length of less than 2^64 bits and produces output of 160-bit
message digest. Big endian scheme is used in the SHA1 implementation. It is used in the
wide applications such as, electronic funds transfer, software distribution, data storage.
Thus, the SCADA data logger uses cryptographic algorithms such as HMACsha1 and
AES-CTR to provide the data integrity and data confidentiality.
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APPENDIX B
EMBEDDED PLATFORM FUNCTIONS
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The Xilinx Embedded Development Kit (EDK) is a suite of tools and intellectual
property (IP) that enables to design a complete embedded processor system for
implementation in a Xilinx FPGA device. The EDK contains main tools such as Xilinx
Platform Studio (XPS) and Software Development Kit (SDK). The XPS is the
development environment for designing the hardware portion of embedded processors
systems. The SDK is used for the designing of software application creation and
verification. The Virtex-5 family of FPGAs offers a wide variety of the features such as
high performance logic, serial connectivity, signal processing and embedded processing
resources. The Xilinx XUPV5-LX110T is a versatile general purpose development board.
This FPGA board contains board memory, connectivity interfaces like serial ports,
Ethernet, 16x2 character LCD and 1 GB compact flash card.
The Software architecture of the SCADA Data logger consists of the following
components: Micro blaze, Xps_Uart16550, Xps_timer, Xps_sysace and Xps_intc. The
Microblaze is the software core processor and highly configurable. It is a Reduced
Instruction Set Computer (RISC) and uses Harvard memory architecture. This processor
runs at a frequency of 125Mhz.
The Xps_Uart166550 implements the hardware and software functionality of the
national semiconductor 16550 UART. It also contains a 16bit programmable baud rate
generator and independent 16 byte transmit and receive FIFOs. It can transmit and
receive independently. Various UART functions such as XUartNs550_Initialize,
XUartNs550_Recv, and XUartNs550_Send are used in the implementation of the UART
in the SCADA data logger.XUartNs550_Intitialize function is used to initialize the uart
component in the software implementation. XUartNs550_Recv and XUart550_send are
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the important functions plays vital role in receiving and transmitting the data through the
uart.
Xps_timer/counter is the 32 bit timer module and have event generation, event
capture capabilities. It can be operated in the count up and countdown mode. Xps_timer
is used for the time stamping in the SCADA data logger. Various timer functions such as
XTmrCtr_Initialize, XTmrCtr_Start, XtmrCtr_SetResetValue, and XTmrCtr_Stop, are in
the SCADA data logger implementation. The XTmrCtr_Initialize function is used to
initialize the timer component on the FPGA. XTmrCtr_Start and XTmrCtr_Stop are used
to start and stop the timer and XtmrCtr_SetResetValue is used to set the reset for the
timer.
Xps_sysace is also known as XPS system ACE interface Controller. It uses
multiple interfaces such as Compact Flash, MPU and JTAG. In SCADA data logger
compact flash card is used to log the transactions. To access the compact card for reading
and writing purposes, XilFats Fat file System access library is used [53]. This library
works for Fat 12, Fat 16 or Fat 32 files. Sysace_fopen, sysace_fread, sysace_fwrite and
sysace_fclose are various fat file functions used in the implementation of SCADA data
logger. First function, Sysace_fopen is file operation used to open the file on the flash
device. It operates in two modes: write and read mode. In read mode, the function opens
a named file stored on the flash drive. If named file does not exist on the device, zero (0)
is returned. In write mode, It creates a new file on the device with given file name.
Second function, Sysace_fwrite function is used to write the data from a pre allocated
buffer to a specified file on the compact flash and it returns the number of characters
written to file. Third function, Sysace_fread function is defined to read the data from the
compact flash card to pre –allocated buffer and it returns the number of characters read
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from the file. Last function, sysace_fclose is used to close the opened file. Generally, the
sysace_fwrite and sysace_read functions are followed by this function to prevent the
corruption of the files on the device.
Xps_intcis the Interrupt controller used to control the interrupts from the various
peripheral devices. The major function of the interrupt controller is to capture the
interrupts from various peripheral devices connected to processor, acknowledge the
devices and enable the interrupt conditions In SCADA data logger, only timer (XTmrCtr)
is connected to interrupt controller and operated in the interrupt mode. XIntc_Initialize,
XIntc_Connect, XIntc_Start, XIntc _Stop are the different interrupt function used in the
data logger implementation. First function, XIntc_Initialize is function to initialize the
interrupt controller on the embedded system. Second function, XIntc_Connect is used to
establish the connection between the interrupt source and the associated handler
dependent on the interrupt. Third function, XIntc_Start is used to start the interrupt
controller by enabling the controller output to the processor. It is operated in the two
modes: simulation and real mode. In the simulation mode, only simulation of the
interrupts is enabled whereas in the real mode the actual hardware interrupt are also
enabled. Last function, XIntc _Stop is used to stop the interrupt controller by disabling
the controller output to the processor. After using this function is called, the interrupt
controller does not handle any more interrupt from the peripheral devices
The various UART used in the implementations of the SCADA Data Logger are
the following:
XUartNs550_Initialize,XUartNs550_SetBaud,XUartNs550_msetLineControlReg,
XUartNs550_Recv, and XUartNs550_Send.The syntax of each function is given below:
XUartNs550_Initialize:
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Syntax:
int XUartNs550_Initialize ( XUartNs550 * InstancePtr, u16 DeviceId )
InstancePtr: Pointer to the XuartNs550 instance,
DeviceId: The unique id of the device controlled by the XUartNs550 instance
XUartNs550_SetBaud:
Syntax:
void XUartNs550_SetBaud ( u32 BaseAddress, u32 InputClockHz, u32
BaudRate )
Base Address: Contains the base address of the Device
Input Clock: The frequency of the input clock.
Baud Rate: The baud rate to be set
XUartNs550_Recv:
unsigned int XUartNs550_Recv ( XUartNs550 * InstancePtr, u8 * BufferPtr,
unsigned int NumBytes )
Instance Ptr: The pointer to the UART instance
BufferPtr: Pointer to buffer for data to be received into
Numbytes: The number of bytes to be received.

XUart550_Send:
Syntax:
unsigned int XUartNs550_Send ( XUartNs550 * InstancePtr, u8 * BufferPtr,
unsigned int NumBytes )
Instance Ptr: The pointer to the UART instance
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BufferPtr: Pointer to buffer for data to be sent
Numbytes: The number of bytes to be received.
The various timer functions are used in the implementation of the SCADA Data
logger. The timer is used to timestamp the data that is from the UARTs. The functions
used for implementation of the timer are the following: XTmrCtr_Initialize,
XTmrCtr_Start: XtmrCtr_Stop, XTmrCtr_SetOptions, and XtmrCtr_SetResetValue.
XTmrCtr_Initialize:
Syntax:
int XTmrCtr_Initialize ( XTmrCtr * InstancePtr, u16 DeviceId )
Instance ptr : Pointe to the XTmrCtr instance
DeviceId : The unique id of the device controlled by XTmrCtr instance. The value
can be obtained from xparameters file.

XTmrCtr_Start:
Syntax:
void XTmrCtr_Start ( XTmrCtr * InstancePtr, u8 TmrCtrNumber )
where:
Instance Ptr : Pointer to the XTmrXtr instance
TmrCtrNumber: The number of the timer counter on which the device have to
operate. Generally each device may have multiple timer counters.
XtmrCtr_Stop
Syntax:
Void XTmrCtr_Stop ( XTmrCtr* InstancePtr, u8 TmrCtrNumber )
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Where:
InstancePtr: The pointer to the XTmrCtr Instance.
TmrCtrNumber: The number of the timer counter on which the device have to
operate. Generally each device may have multiple timer counters.
XTmrCtr_SetOptions
Syntax:
u32 XTmrCtr_SetOptions ( XTmrCtr * InstancePtr, u8 TmrCtrNumber )
Where:
InstancePtr: The pointer to the XTmrCtr Instance.
TmrCtrNumber: The number of the timer counter on which the device have to
operate. Generally each device may have multiple timer counters.
XtmrCtr_SetResetValue
Syntax:
Void XtmrCtr_SetResetValue (XTmrCtr * InstancePtr, u8 TmrCtrNumber, u32
ResetValue )
Where:
InstancePtr: The pointer to the XTmrCtr Instance.
TmrCtrNumber: The number of the timer counter on which the device have to
operate. Generally each device may have multiple timer counters.
Reset Value: The value to reset the timer counter.

The XilFats file system library provides the read/write access to files stored on the
Xilinx compact flash drive. This library works with Fata16 on Xilinx FPGA. The
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following are the functions used to perform the various operations: Sysace _fopen,
Sysace_fread, Sysace_fwrite and Sysace_close.
Sysace _fopen
This is sysace file operation to open the file stored on the flash device. It operates
in two modes: read mode and write mode. In read mode, the function opens a named file
stored on the flash drive. If named file does not exist on the device, zero (0) is returned.
In write mode, It creates a new file on the device with given name.
Syntax:
void *sysace_fopen (const char *file, const char *mode)

Sysace_fread:
This procedure is used to read data from file opened by sysace_fopen function in
to pre allocated buffer. The function returns the number of characters read from file. The
value of the size is one(1).The size of the buffer must be at least equal to the value of
count.
Syntax:
int sysace_fread (void *buffer, int size, int count, void *file)
Sysace_fwrite
This function is used to write the data from pre- allocated buffer to compact flash
drive with specified file name. The value of the size is one (1).The size of the buffer must
be at least equal to the value of count.
Syntax:
int sysace_fwrite (void *buffer, int size, int count, void *file)
Sysace_close
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This function is used to close the open file. It also synchronizes the buffer
memory to cache memory. Generally, the sysace_fwrite and sysace_read functions are
followed by this function to prevent the corruption of the files on the device. It returns an
integer value of 0 on success or -1 on failure of function.
Syntax:
int sysace_fclose (void *file)
The XIntc is used to control the interrupt from the various peripherals and process
them. The main functions of the interrupt controller is to capture, acknowledge and
enable the interrupts. The various Interrupt function used in the implementation of the
SCADA data logger are the following: XIntc_Initialize, XIntc_Connect, XIntc_Start
XIntc _Stop.The syntax of each function is given below.
XIntc_Initialize
This interrupt function is used to initialize a specific interrupt controller instance.
Syntax:
int XIntc_Initialize (XIntc * InstancePtr, u16 DeviceId )
InstancePtr: Pointer to the XIntc instance
DeviceId: The Unique id of the device controlled by XIntc instance.
XIntc_Connect
Syntax:
int XIntc_Connect ( XIntc * InstancePtr, u8 Id, XInterruptHandler Handler,
void * CallBackRef )
InstancePtr: The pointe to the XIntc instance.
Id: This contains the ID of the interrupt source.
Handler: Interrupt Handler
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CallBackRef: The instance pointer of the connecting driver.
XIntc_Start
This function starts the interrupt controller by enabling the output from the
controller to the processor. This function operated in two modes: simulation mode, in
which only simulation of the interrupts is enabled and in the Real Mode the hardware
interrupts are also enabled. The return value for the function is either XST_SUCCESS or
XST failure. Generally this function is called only after the initialization of the Interrupt
controller.
Syntax:
int XIntc_Start(XIntc * InstancePtr,u8 Mode)
InstancePtr: pointer to the XIntc instance.
Mode: Either real or simulation.
XIntc _Stop:
This function is used to stop the interrupt controller by disabling the output. After
this function is called, the interrupt controller does not initialize any more interrupts. The
return value of the function is Null.
Syntax:
Void XIntc_Stop(XIntc * InstancePtr)
Where InstancePtr : pointer to the XIntc controller.
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